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Abstract	
  
Due to its reliance on the civil electrical grid, the Department of Defense has significant
energy security vulnerabilities. DoD does not have energy production capabilities within
its organization necessary to sustain the operations of a military installation. Its current
installation energy strategy is a combination of energy reduction measures and
renewable production efforts. Therefore, increased threats from cyber attacks combined
with an aging electrical infrastructure threaten DoD’s energy supply to its installations.
The electrical grid provides aggressors an opportune target for weakening military
response capabilities in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. While DoD is
successfully using energy more efficiently, it is failing produce power on the scale needed
to secure its energy future.
This paper examines the Department of Defense energy security strategy and identifies a
sustainable solution using nuclear power. The increased interest in Small Modular
Reactor (SMR) Technology presents the Department of Defense with a power solution
that is adaptable to military installation use. This paper examines potential SMRs for
commercialization and use on a military installation. It identifies what reactor
characteristics are important to the Department of Defense and selects an SMR design to
fit DoD’s energy needs. The paper then presents an implementation strategy taking into
consideration the unique aspects of siting a small nuclear power facility on a military
base. It presents financing options for the facility as well as addressing staffing and
management considerations.
Small modular nuclear reactor technology is ideally suited to fill the supply voids in
DoD’s energy security portfolio. Through the adoption of reactor technology, DoD not
only secures its ability to respond to man-made and natural threats, but it also secures
the future of the American people it protects.
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Chapter	
  1:	
  	
  Introduction	
  

	
  

Over the last decade, the threats to national security underwent a dramatic transformation.
In addition to threats from direct aggressors such as those faced at Pearl Harbor or during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, security professionals now face threats from a less overt enemy.
A complicated network of loosely aligned, ideologically motivated activists, defines the
threat environment today. At times these individuals act solely in support of their cause.
In other situations, ideologues are used as weapons in a larger, state supported form of
21st century Cold War. While the threat of conventional terrorist attacks, such as the
events of 9/11 or the Boston Marathon Bombing (2013), are still real and present, a more
insidious and pervasive threat targets the national infrastructure. A new and dangerous
weapon in the world of national security is the threat from cyber attacks.
In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described
structuring the United States Military in order to be prepared to respond to the
complicated security environment of the 21st century.
“We must prepare for a broad range of security challenges on the horizon-ranging from
the military modernization programs of other countries to the non-state groups
developing more cunning and destructive means to attack the United States and our allies
and partners.”[1]
State and non-state actors realize that Americans enjoy a sense of security stemming from
its physical isolation. America has clearly defined boarders and shares ideological ties
with its neighbors to the North and South. Oceans separate Americans from the upheaval
felt in volatile nations of Southeast Asia and the constant geopolitical uncertainty in
Western Europe. The American sense of security is misplaced. The world is truly
interconnected. Oceans or fences no longer deter the threats to America. Terrorist groups
travel easily across boarders or make attacks from remote locations with a computer and
an Internet connection. Terrorists now target America by attacking its infrastructure
networks. These attacks can be physical but more often are cyber based. Automation
pervades society. The daily lives of Americans revolve around the use of technology for
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even the most basic transactions. At the individual level, actions such as buying fuel for a
car, picking up milk at the store or paying a mortgage payment are all done via digital
transaction. On a community level, daily operations are equally automated.
Communities use automation to dispatch emergency services, warn residents of
threatening weather conditions and maintain a constant electrical supply. The increased
automation in society promotes a feeling of security that stems from an expectation of
quick and immediate reaction to problems of all kinds. However, Americans were
stunned in 2013, when thousands fell victim to a cyber attack on the retail chain Target
that resulted in loss of personal banking information. The size and scope of the attack
were shocking, in part because Americans relied on a misplaced sense of security.
As Secretary Gates noted, the Department of Defense is fully aware of the changing
nature of the threat to national security. In an effort to combat this threat, DoD is moving
aggressively to protect itself from cyber attacks. In 2010, DoD established US Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM) to specifically combat these threats. DoD utilizes extensive
security protocols for communication and information transfer. It maintains and operates
over 15,000 different computer networks across 4,000 military installations worldwide.
Daily, DoD personnel use over seven million computers and telecommunications
tools.[1]
Yet at home, DoD still relies entirely on the civilian power grid to provide sustaining
electricity to its computer networks. Despite having an extensive network security
system, any operation can be brought to complete stop by simple removing its power
source. Without electrical power movement orders, resupply requests and battlefield
tracking all stop. The civilian power grid provides aggressors a way to directly influence
the response capability of the US Military without directly attacking it.
DoD defines threats to its energy supply as threats to its energy security. Over the last
decade, DoD has tied energy security and climate change together. It sought solutions
through a reduction and optimization of energy use. It sought energy independence using
renewable energy projects. Each year, the Department of Defense directs billions of
2

dollars toward increasing its energy efficiency in order to establish a more robust energy
security posture.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new approach to installation energy security
using a nuclear small modular reactor (SMR) solution. This paper first examines the
current DoD energy security strategy with a focus on installation energy security. It
analyzes the combination of reduction initiatives and renewable production measures to
determine if DoD is successfully securing its installation energy needs. The paper reveals
a significant gap between the reduced energy demanded by DoD and the power that is
supplied by its renewable energy projects. To fill the energy demand gap, the paper
proposes the use of a small modular nuclear reactor. After a brief overview of SMR
technology, the paper compares four proposed SMR designs and evaluates them for use
on a military installation based on reactor characteristics. It then proposes an
implementation strategy detailing how to most effectively utilize SMR technology to
meet the energy demands of a military installation. The implementation strategy includes
detailed siting considerations based impact to mission performance. A staffing solution is
proposed that combines internal military nuclear specialists with external reactor
operators. Finally, a technology readiness assessment is used to identify the steps still
required to implement a nuclear reactor energy security solution.
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Chapter	
  2:	
  	
  The	
  Department	
  of	
  Defense	
  Energy	
  Demand	
  
The mission of the Department of Defense is “to provide the military forces needed to
deter war and to protect the security of our country.”[2] The structure required to support
the mission is enormous. DoD employs over 2.1 million military and civilian personnel
who operate from several hundred thousand buildings located at one of over 5000
different locations. The total geographic footprint of DoD is over 30 million acres of
land.[2] As such, DoD has at its command human and physical resources that rival all
private sector organizations. DoD is one of the largest departments of the United States
government. Furthermore, the US spends more than any other nation-state on defense,
committing 4.4% of its annual GDP on DoD.[3]
In order to meets its mission, DoD works to efficiently allocate and properly locate of its
resources to facilitate swift and effective responses to threats to national security. Doing
so requires incredible amounts of energy. In 2012, DOD spent a total of $20B on energy.
DoD used the energy purchased for a wide range of applications from fueling vehicles to
powering installations. The majority of use was for powering tactical equipment in the
form of operational energy. Of the total energy consumed, 26% went toward use within
buildings or installation power.[4]
Installation energy is the power needed to maintain the base infrastructure. Installation
energy is primarily sourced from local commercial power distributors who sell to the
DoD facility like any other customer. Operational energy is used to project forces
forward on the battlefield. Operational energy comes in many forms. Petroleum is the
largest form of operational energy used in DoD. DoD uses petroleum fuels to fly aircraft,
power boats, drive vehicles and run generators. Other sources of operational energy
include the nuclear power used on naval vessels and battery power for individual soldier
equipment.

Operational	
  Energy	
  
DoD is heavily dependent on petroleum as its main fuel source for operations. In 2011,
DoD used 116.8 million barrels of fuel (mbbls) at a cost of $17.2B. In FY 13 DoD
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budged $16.3B (104 mbbls) for fuel purchases.[5] DoD has long recognized overreliance on petroleum-based fuel products is a significant threat to operational force
projection. DoD is actively seeking alternative fuel sources. In FY13, DoD allocated
$1.6B for operational energy initiatives, including research and development into
alternative fuel sources for both Naval and Air Force equipment. The Navy is exploring
options to replace diesel with biodiesel in its petroleum-powered vessels. The US Air
Force is looking for alternative fuels for jets and cargo aircraft. In the FY13 Operational
Energy Budget Certification Report, Sharon Burke, the assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs, expressed significant concerns for all
departments of the military and their lack of “systems and tools required to incorporate
energy security considerations in to their requirements and acquisition processes” All
three major components lacked the ability to forecast into their acquisition programs the
requirements needed to meet energy security needs. [6]

Installation	
  Energy	
  
DoD installation energy demand in FY2012 was 215 trillion BTU, which represents
about 1% of the total US commercial sector energy consumption.[4] Unlike the
operational energy needs, installation energy is used across the DoD vast physical
footprint with the mission of sustaining, training, and equipping service members in
preparation for their various military missions. DOD utilizes its installations in a variety
of ways.

•

Training: One of the single most important functions of military installations is to
provide service members a place to conduct training on their specific set of skills.
Given that military service members use a skill set that is unique to their
organizations, the Department of Defense must have specialized locations to
conduct training. For example, large plots of secluded land are required to
conduct training on weapons systems larger than small arms. These types of
systems include explosives, missiles, radar systems and many other large-scale
weapons. DOD establishes a geographic footprint that allows its employees to
train on the use of these weapons while keeping the civilian population safe from
their effects.
5

•

Operations: The operational infrastructure of DoD is vast. Traditional operational
units such as Army brigades or Air Force Squadrons require a footprint from
which to plan their training, manage their people and prepare for deployed
operations. Command and control centers exist throughout the military providing
continuous oversight of and communications capabilities for forces deployed and
abroad. The command and control infrastructure of DoD requires continuous
power supplies and communications channels to monitor operations worldwide
and to be prepared to respond to national security threats.

•

Sustaining: There are two major components to sustaining DoD forces;
Equipment Sustainment and Manpower Sustainment
o Equipment sustainment. This includes scheduled services and
maintenance as well as unscheduled repairs. The specialized equipment
within DoD requires specialized facilities to conduct maintenance on
equipment. The spectrum of equipment in need of maintenance is broad
ranging from a Nimitz class aircraft carrier to an F18 fighter to an M4
Carbine rifle. All of these items require continuous support and
maintenance to stay operational and DoD must have the infrastructure
network to support that maintenance.
o Manpower Sustainment. Sustaining the employees of DoD includes a
variety of infrastructure demands. Many service members and their
families live on military installations. Housing for these individuals
includes single-family homes, duplexes and barracks for single soldiers.
In addition, the military has temporary housing for service members
conducting training away from their home installations. To support the
military manpower, there are extensive health and dental facilities as well
as educational resources for employees and their families.
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•

Projection: DoD meets national security threats outside the contiguous United
States by projecting forces onto the battlefield. It does this primarily through sea
and air projection as a first step and then land projection. Moving forces from
stateside operations via land or air requires projection platforms be situated and
postured for movement. Infrastructure that supports these types of movements is
naval stations and air bases. These facilities are geographic cache of logistical
supplies needed to move operational units forward from the United States to face
threats in other places.

In 2012, DoD spent $3.8B on electrical power, heat and cooling for facilities. DoD
consumed 215,100 BBtu (billion British thermal units) of energy requiring approximately
7 GW of power production.1 The largest consumer of facility energy within DoD is the
Army, which accounts for 37% of the total facility energy consumed.[4]

Figure 1: DoD Facility Energy Consumption and Cost[4]

1

The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity of
90%. The conversion rate is consistent throughout the entirety of the analysis in this document.
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80% of the facility energy consumed by DoD goes toward natural gas and electricity.
This is primarily used for power, climate control and water heating.

Figure 2: DoD Facility Energy Consumption by Type[4]

When looking across the spectrum of DoD fixed installations, there is a wide range in the
amount of energy demanded. The demand is primarily influenced by the size of each
installation, the environmental conditions surrounding the installation, its departmental
mission and the square footage of buildings requiring energy. Thus DoD categorizes its
energy usage using energy intensity. Energy intensity is measured in billion British
thermal units per gross square foot of facility space (BBtu/Gsf). In an effort to identify
the most energy consuming facilities, DoD began an aggressive campaign in FY2010 to
monitor and track energy consumption at the installation level rather than as an aggregate
whole. By measuring energy consumption at the installation level, DoD gained a more
specific understanding of its energy uses and needs. For example, a small Naval Air
Station in the Florida Keys will have a different energy consumption profile than a
garrison army base in Fort Wainwright, Alaska. A large Air Force basic training facility
in Texas will consume energy differently than Twenty Nine Palms, a remote weapons
testing facility in the California desert. This data allowed planners to develop targeted
energy reduction plans for each facility based on consumption, number of facilities,
mission and the environment.[7]
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Chapter	
  3:	
  	
  Department	
  of	
  Defense	
  Energy	
  Strategy	
  
“Sustainability is not an individual Departmental program; rather it is an organizing
paradigm that applies to all DoD mission and program areas”[8]
The Department of Defense outlines its strategic goals as an organization in the
Quadrennial Defense Review Report. The latest report was published in February 2010
(QDR 10). In that report, DoD specifically addresses energy security as “having assured
access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient
energy to meet operational needs.” [1] Further, DoD links, climate change and energy
security. It devotes considerable effort to increasing its energy security by reducing its
environmental impact. Infrastructure (installation) and operational energy efficiency
programs are foremost in DoD’s energy security strategies including alternative fuel
sources, less pollutant fuel sources and the identification of new fuel-free technology.
Domestically, DoD is looking to balance energy usage and production through reduction
efforts as well as production initiatives. These efforts must be conducted without
sacrificing the mission capabilities of an installation. [1]

Energy	
  Security	
  Defined	
  
Energy security for the Department of Defense means always having an available supply
of energy to conduct operations. Without power to conduct operations, the Department of
Defense assets are useless. Energy is needed to maneuver, command and communicate
and is essential to every element of every military operation. The energy itself is derived
from many sources such as petroleum to power vehicles, aircraft and generators. It can
also come from local commercial providers in the form of grid electricity and natural gas.
One of the largest threats to energy security for DoD is its dependence on fossil fuels,
particularly in operations. In the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, fuel
convoys were essential to support operations and fuel trucks were literally everywhere.
Attacks on these convoys caused significant delays and disruptions of the operational
fighting capabilities of forces on the ground. [8] In addition, simply acquiring and
moving the petroleum to the necessary general location is often challenging as worldwide
petroleum distribution networks are at increased risk for attack. Shipping lanes
9

transporting bulk oil to refineries face disruptions at choke points such as Strait of
Hormuz and Straits of Malacca. Pirates, regional political instability and military actions
all threaten shipments of petroleum worldwide. Such instability can lead to drastic price
fluctuations in the cost of oil. To counter instability in the petroleum market, DoD has
chosen to acquire and store vast amounts of petroleum reserves.[8]
Energy vulnerabilities also exist within the U.S. Most electrical power and natural gas
for fixed installations in the U.S. is sourced from local commercial suppliers. As Dr.
Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
acknowledges:
“Facilities energy is critical to mission assurance. Our fixed installations support
combat operations more directly than ever before, and the serve as staging
platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations
are largely dependent on commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption
due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events and a potential kinetic or
cyber attack.”[8]
Military installations at home provide not just housing for service members and storage
for equipment. They provide key strategic staging locations for military force projection
operations in the form of railheads and runways. Installations are an essential network of
communications, command and control centers providing real time monitoring of defense
operations worldwide. Installations are staging locations for disaster relief efforts
following local natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy and Hurricane Katrina. Yet
these facilities are all vulnerable because they depend almost entirely on external sources
of energy. In the event of a natural disaster or even just a simple outage, military
installations must wait, like any other customer, for the utility to restore power. Some
critical systems have backup generators that provide short-term power in these situations.
These generators are limited in number and cannot be expected to run for extended
operations.
It is important to note that physical threats to the electrical grid impact not only DoD
installations but the general public as well. For example, an April 2013, an attack on a
California power transmission substation highlighted the vulnerabilities of America’s
10

power gird. During the 19-minute attack, assailants fired bullets into transformers that
supplied power into Silicon Valley. The electric company was able to reroute power to
prevent a blackout however the repairs to the substation took 27 days. Even more
alarming was the relative ease with which the attackers executed the assault. The
weapons used were not sophisticated. They faced no resistance or security at the
substation. The assistants were able to methodically execute their attack exactly as
planned with no interference from either the power company or local police agency.
Across America, the electrical grid is no different from this California transmission
station. Should America’s enemies seek to cripple the military infrastructure, the power
network used to sustain an installation is an excellent domestic terrorism target. [9]
Additionally, there are ever increasing concerns about the potential for a cyber attack on
our nations electrical grid. A recent article by Dan Weissman of NPR describes an
electrical grid security exercise conducted by North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) called Grid Ex 2013 that took place in November of 2013. More
than 2000 utilities workers, regulators and law enforcement officials participated in the
exercise. While the results of this exercise have not yet been published, it is important to
note that American utility companies are taking the treat of cyber security and kinetic
attacks to the grid very seriously. Exercises such as this help to bring to light the true
nature of our society in the event of a prolonged power outage.[10] In the event of a
cyber or kinetic attack on the nations electrical grid, the military would be called upon to
exercise its homeland defense mission and act as a staging location for relief and repair
efforts. Unfortunately, due to its own dependence on commercial power, it is likely that
military forces will be just as helpless as the average citizen in such a crisis.

Operational	
  Energy	
  Strategy	
  
The three key operational energy goals of DoD were outlined in the May 2011
Operational Energy Strategy. [11]
1.

More Fight, Less Fuel: Reduce the demand for energy in military
operations
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2.

More options, less risk: Expand and secure the supply of energy to
military operations.

3.

More capability, less cost: Build energy security into the future force.

The total budget for operational energy from FY13-17 included $9.0B for operational
energy programs outside the purchase of bulk fuel. Of the $9.0B, 92% of the budget is
directed toward research, development, testing and procurement in support of energy
initiatives. 90% of the energy initiatives are specifically focused on demand reduction
solutions. This results in $8.1B between FY2013 to 2017 being used to find technology
to help reduce demand.[6]
However, $8.1B represents a fraction of the money projected to be spent on bulk fuel
purchases. Using the fuel purchase projections from FY2013 OE Budget Cert Report and
accounting for an estimated reduction in use of 5%, the total number of barrels of fuel
purchased between FY13-FY17 will be 384.8 mbbls at a cost of $56.7B ($3.51 a gallon).2
DoD acknowledges the enormity of the energy resources:
“Our [energy] posture is imposing costs at all levels, strategic, operational,
tactical and financial.” S. Burke, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Operational Energy Plans and Programs [8]
The force projection capabilities of the US Military rely almost entirely on the use
petroleum based fuel products. A significant technological shift is required to find
alternative fuel sources for equipment such as helicopter’s, aircraft and tanks which rely
heavy on combustion of petroleum fuel for power. In the 1950s, the Navy made a
technological leap forward in reducing fuel costs by switching to a nuclear powered
vessel. Possible alternatives being explored are hydrogen-powered vehicles and batterypowered vehicles. The Department must be careful when looking at alternatives that it
does not sacrifice its force projection capabilities in the name of energy efficiency.
Petroleum is a reliable, portable and powerful source of fuel. Yet it is also limiting in that
it is expended quickly and requires an extensive supply chain. However, until technology
2

5% was chosen for a percentage reduction based on a projection report from the FY12 Operational
Energy Annual Report. This report predicted a reduction of 5% from year FY13-14. I applied this
reduction annually. The projection is purely an approximation. Factors such as the price of oil, the nature
of military conflicts abroad and actually effectiveness of demand reduction initiatives will all impact usage.
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evolves to replace petroleum, the Department of Defense looks to simply build
efficiencies into the current combustion technologies. While this efficiency will reduce
the amount of operational energy used, there will not be significant reductions unless the
base use of combustion power is changed.

Installation	
  Energy	
  Strategy	
  
In an effort to reduce its vulnerability to energy supply disruptions, DoD is focusing on
reducing its energy consumption through conservation and improved efficiency. More
than $1.1B has been budgeted for energy conservation improvements to buildings.
Upgrades to facilities include measures such as replacing windows, updating HVAC
systems and improving lighting.
Additionally, DoD is looking at ways to produce its own energy on-site. On-site energy
production is a key element in reducing the energy security vulnerabilities within DoD in
the event of a commercial grid collapse or outage. Recognizing that energy independence
is critical to ensure operational security, DoD is analyzing the feasibilities of various
renewable energy sources coupled with the use of “micro-grid technology” to control
and store on-site energy.[8]

Energy	
  Laws	
  and	
  Regulations	
  
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 sets goals for annual energy consumption guidelines,
which increase the usage of renewable energy sources for all federal facilities and
agencies. Table 1 shows the required amount of energy consumed by federal agencies to
come from renewable sources.
Table 1: Energy Policy Act of 2005 Renewable Energy Goals

Year	
  
FY07-‐09	
  
FY10-‐12	
  

Percent	
  Consumption	
  from	
  
Renewables	
  
3%	
  
5%	
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Additionally, the Energy Independence and Security act of 2007 (EISA 2007) and
Executive Order 13423 (Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy and
Transportation Management) combine to set further goals for federal agency
consumption resulting in a 30% decrease by 2015 and an increase in renewable energy
source consumption of 7.5% by FY2013. The regulations outline practices to enhance
energy conservation and require the complete metering of all federal facilities for natural
gas and electricity by given target years. Further, all new buildings must be constructed in
accordance with energy efficient standards and equipment purchased for federal buildings
to be energy efficient. Finally, by 2025, Federal regulations (10 U.S.C§2911e) requires
25% procurement of energy from renewable sources.[7]
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Chapter	
  4:	
  	
  Energy	
  Security	
  Programs	
  
Net	
  Zero:	
  Background	
  
DoD is not conducting its research and implementing its energy programs in isolation. As
early as 2006, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), working with the
Department of Energy, began using the term Net Zero to describe buildings and building
construction that met certain characteristics related to cost effective, reduced energy use
(NZEB). [12] According to the NREL, 40% of the primary energy used in the United
States goes to commercial and residential buildings. 70% of the electricity used goes to
these buildings. Due to increasing technological demands, the demand for electricity is
only expected to rise in the future years. Figure 3 shows NREL’s estimate for the project
grown in building energy consumption by sector.

Figure 3: Projected Growth in building energy use relative to other sector[12]

Nested under the concept of reducing the negative impact of energy production, the
NREL sought to find ways to reduce building energy consumption by promoting NZEBs.
NZEBs are buildings that significantly reduce their energy consumption needs through
technologically efficient upgrades, behavior modification and the use of renewable
15

energy. Significant effort went into actually defining and categorizing the energy use of
a building as well as working to reduce consumption through efficiencies. To reach Net
Zero, companies are encouraged to first focus on demand reduction because this is most
cost effective. Only once demand has been appreciably reduced does the company began
pursuing renewable energy supply options. [12]
NREL’s study, Lessons learned from Case Studies of Six High-Performance buildings,
discussed the efforts to take six commercial buildings and make them NZEB. [13] The
results were mixed. The study demonstrated that while technology can reduce energy
costs, achieving Net Zero is very difficult. All six buildings used more energy than
anticipated and produced less than anticipated. Failure to reduce energy usage was
attributed to a number of factors including an overly optimistic projection about the
ability to modify energy usage behavior of individuals. Additionally, some concepts such
as day lighting failed to provide adequate lighting causing an increase beyond prediction
of electrical lighting. Energy usage from plug loading was higher than forecast. There
was also failure on the supply side of the model. Photovoltaic (PV) energy production
was less than models forecast. Overall the study learned that there is no single solution to
making a building reach Net Zero energy balance and it takes a whole building approach
to solve the problem. [13]

The	
  Army	
  Net	
  Zero	
  Program	
  
Since DoD is the largest energy consumer in the US government, [14] it and DoE began a
joint initiative in 2008 to study the energy use of the military and identify methods for
reducing demand and increasing use of renewable energy. The NREL conducted the
study and used Marine Corps Air Station Miramar as its prototype installation. Based on
that study, the NREL issued Net Zero Energy Military Installations: A Guide to
Assessment and Planning as a guide for the implementation of an energy conservation
strategy for a military installation.
A key factor to strategy development is recognizing some of the unique constraints of a
military installation. A primary consideration is project and mission compatibility. Under
no circumstances can an energy reduction project hinder the accomplishment of a
16

military mission. Thus special understanding of military operations is necessary in order
to find the right solution for each installation. For example, at an installation with high
levels of fixed or rotary wing aircraft traffic, one would not want to provide additional
energy via wind turbine power as these devices present obstacles to air movement. The
impact on the security of the installation is another key factor. Ideally the power
generation source would be located on the installation premises. This increases
installation security as the logistics support for the power facility is contained within the
parameters of the installation. An off-site power source forces the installation to be
dependent on either a commercial electrical grid or constant supply lines such as fuel
tankers. Installation environment will also play a role site selection and strategy.
Military installations exist in a wide variety of climates so there is no single solution for
all installations. Additional considerations include economic factors such as life cycle
costs, storage costs and technology maturity. [14]
In 2011 the Army initiated its Net Zero Pilot program on 17 installations. Under this
program, selected installations were provided assistance in achieving Net Zero in energy,
water, waste or a combination of the three. In this paper, the focus will be on the Net
Zero Energy programs rather than waste or water program. Figure 4 shows the locations
of these installations and their Net Zero program

Figure 4: Army Net Zero Pilot Installations[15]
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The Army Net Zero Energy goal is for an installation to produce as much energy as it
uses. Within its pilot installations, the Army has made considerable effort to reduce
energy demand. NREL theorizes that the most economic way to reach Net Zero energy is
to reduce energy demand. Behavior modification accomplishes demand reduction without
the need of capital expenditures and the use of energy efficient technology. [14] NREL
calls upon installation leaders to find “opportunities for procedural, behavioral, process
and operational energy saving actions (relying) on engaging the attention and creativity
of personnel.” [14]

Figure 5: Net Zero Energy Hierarchy

The Army has taken this suggestion as its first and primary step to reaching a Net Zero
energy security solution. Figure 5 illustrates the Net Zero Hierarchy. [14] The Energy
Engineering Analysis Program conducted energy surveys of the pilot installations to
determine baseline energy needs and identify inefficiencies in energy usage. [14]
Energy surveys led to the development of the Army Meter Data Management System,
which monitors installation energy usage at the individual building level and helps
installation, appointed energy managers find solutions to energy waste at their location.
The Army also built a robust staff of energy managers who monitor energy usage at each
installation and provide reporting through the Army Energy and Water Reporting System.
New buildings are required to following construction guidance with the aims of making
them as energy efficient as possible. An award and recognition system was developed to
recognize installation leaders who were innovators in energy reduction. These are all
examples of procedural and policy measures aimed at simply reducing consumption. [16]
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Additional energy reduction measures under Net Zero include building modernization
projects. Improvements to HVAC systems, lighting systems, use of LED lights and
improved control systems all helped reduce energy waste on military installations. Bases
use thermal imaging technology to develop a building thermal envelope and find where
buildings lack insulation. Energy managers improve control systems to allow for a more
efficient use of building systems such as precooling buildings, automating lighting
operations and optimizing the use of fans and blowers. [15] Many of these projects are
paid for with all up front capital cost deferred from the military using unique financing
options. One finance option is a utility energy service contracts (UESC) where a utility
pays for the upfront capital costs of the project and is then repaid by the energy savings
generated by the improvements. Energy saving performance contracts (EPSC) are
arrangements between the Army and an energy service company where the company
analyzes, develops, funds and manages energy savings projects and is repaid by the
energy saved. [15]
The Army is aggressively pursuing a number of micro power renewable energy projects
on its pilot installations. Most projects are solar photovoltaic projects producing between
anywhere between 0.10 to 10 MW of energy. Most projects are small in scale and used
to power outdoor lighting or heat water. Some projects use installation waste to produce
energy to augment the base. The most successful installation is Fort Carson, which gets
3.5% of its total energy from renewable sources. [15]

Department	
  of	
  the	
  Navy:	
  Large	
  Scale	
  Renewable	
  Projects	
  
The Navy’s renewable energy program results in the production of 20% of the Navy’s
electricity being produced from renewable sources, the majority from two large-scale
projects: a 270 MW geothermal station at China Lake, CA and the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard solid waste project in Portsmouth VA.
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Figure 6: Geothermal Plant at China Lake, CA[4]

The China Lake Project produces 77% of the Navy’s total renewable energy and the
NNSY solid waste plant produces 20%. At both facilities, the electricity produced is sold
to the local utility and not used by the installation. Because it is not consumed by the
installation, it is not counted toward the EPA 2005 act goal of consuming 7% of all
electricity from renewable sources by 2013. [7]
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Chapter	
  5:	
  	
  Energy	
  Security	
  Program	
  Analysis	
  
In addition to analyzing energy security in terms of reducing greenhouse gases and
conservation, an assessment of security of supply and reliability of supply of energy is
also necessary. To achieve energy security, DoD key infrastructure must have a constant
supply of energy regardless of the source or the situational environment. This section
provides an analysis of energy source and reliability of energy source in order to frame
the effectiveness of DoD’s various energy programs in terms of energy security.
1. Will DoD meet its regulatory and legal energy efficiency requirements?
2. How effective are the energy reduction measures at optimizing the energy
need by DoD to operate?
3. How effective are the renewable energy measures at producing a reliable
source of power that meets the operational needs of an installation?
1.	
  Will	
  DoD	
  meet	
  its	
  regulatory	
  and	
  legal	
  energy	
  security	
  requirements?	
  
DoD established a timeline to meet its legally mandated energy security targets. This is
the most basic metric of program evaluation in that it is a known and established metric
for DoD to meet. Table 2 illustrates DoD’s internal analysis on its progress towards
meeting its energy security goals. [4]
Table 2: FY 2012 Progress Report

Goals	
  and	
  
Objective	
  
Reduction	
  in	
  
Facility	
  energy	
  
intensity	
  (EISA	
  
2007)	
  
Increase	
  Renewable	
  
Energy	
  
Consumption	
  (EPA	
  
2005)	
  

Metric	
  

DoD	
  FY12	
  
Performance	
  
BTU/gross	
  square	
   -‐17.7%	
  

Target	
  	
  	
  

Evaluation	
  

-‐21.0%	
  

Fail	
  

4.0%	
  

5%	
  

Fail	
  

9.6%	
  

25%	
  by	
  2025	
  

Failed	
  to	
  
meet	
  
target	
  

foot	
  

Renewable	
  energy	
  
consumption	
  as	
  a	
  
percentage	
  of	
  total	
  
facility	
  energy	
  
consumed	
  
Increase	
  Renewable	
   Renewable	
  Energy	
  
Production	
  (US	
  Reg)	
   produced	
  and	
  
procured	
  as	
  a	
  
percentage	
  of	
  total	
  
facility	
  energy	
  
consumed	
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Table 2 illustrates the DoD is not on track to meet any of its energy security goals. It is
not in compliance with US law and regulation. The most significant failure is its goal to
increase renewable energy production to 25% by 2025. Currently DoD is well below its
target metric to be on track to meet that goal. Without a significant change in its
renewable energy production category it will not meet the goal.
2.	
  How	
  effective	
  are	
  the	
  energy	
  reduction	
  measures	
  at	
  optimizing	
  the	
  energy	
  need	
  by	
  
DoD	
  to	
  operate?	
  	
  
There are two variables in evaluating this metric; optimal energy consumption and cost of
optimization. The first is the effectiveness of the energy reduction measures to reach
optimal consumption levels. In order to achieve energy security, DoD needs to be using
its energy in the most efficient ways. Figure 7 shows that 91% of DoD’s energy project
appropriations are aimed at reducing energy use.

Figure 7: FY12 Energy Project Appropriations[4]

Internal analysis from the Department shows that it does not forecast meeting this
requirement. DoD argues a more realistic goal would have allowed for smaller target
percentages earlier on in the program to allow for time for funding, design and
implementation of energy efficiency projects. It expects to meet the 30% goal by 2020
instead of 2015.[8]
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Figure 8 shows DoD’s progress in reducing its energy intensity footprint in order to meet
the goals outlined in EISA 2007. Currently DoD must reduce energy intensity at a rate of
3% per year in order to meet the goal 30% reduction by 2015.

Figure 8 Progress Toward Facility Energy Intensity Reduction Goals[8]

While the Department has failed to meet the targeted reduction goals necessary to meet
its targeted 30% reduction goal, it has been successful in reducing its installation energy
use. It has instituted a robust system of procedural and technical tools to monitor
consumption. EISA 2007 mandates a 30% reduction. This level of consumption might
not be the optimal level of consumption for an origination as large and diverse as the
Department of Defense. It has a unique mission and utilizes one of kind equipment in its
day-to-day operations. It operates in a wide variety of physical environments.
Understanding its constraints and having accurate systems to measure consumption will
allow DoD to establish its own estimate for optimal consumption levels. Further analysis
is needed to determine the optimal level of energy consumption for DoD that may differ
from the mandated 30% reduction. Despite not meeting its goals, the Department has
been effective at curbing energy use.
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The second measure of the energy reduction programs is cost versus return on
optimization. However, this measure is difficult to quantify. By using an energy
performance savings contracts (EPSC) or utility energy service contracts (UESC) much
of the up front cost is assumed by a contractor or utility. EPSC and UESC pass the cost
of the project to the contractor or utility that is then repaid by the energy savings
produced. DoD’s costs relating to these projects are deferred yet they are very real.
While DoD has little to no upfront expense, it also does not recognize any gain until the
contractor or utility has recouped its costs. An installation experiencing a demand
reduction will pay a reduced power bill. The difference however, between the reduced
bill and the old bill, is paid to the contractor. Thus, DoD does not actually recognize any
savings until the contract is completely recouped, which could be years or even decades
later. During that time, many systems will require routine repair and upgrades; those
costs are passed on to DoD, but again, any benefits are not recognized until much later.
In order to accurately analyze the cost effectiveness of energy reduction measures, all it is
useful to assume to be incurred by DoD regardless if they are a direct procurement or on
a delayed UESC/EPSC payment plan. Figure 9 illustrates the annual expense of energy
efficiency investments (direct, EPSC, UESC) verse the annual energy savings from the
projects FY2007 through FY2011.3 Energy savings estimates came from either actual
savings, in BBtu, or those projected by the contract if actual savings was not reported.
Using the average cost for a BTU of energy during the specified fiscal year was to
calculate the total savings from the energy efficiency projects.
Figure 9 contrasts the expense with the anticipated annual return from the projects.
Expenses include the amount of money either directly appropriated or awarded through
UESC and EPSC during each fiscal year to energy reduction measures. Returns are
based on the anticipated savings (in Bbtu) estimated by the contractor.4 Assuming that the
savings realized from the project meet the anticipated goals, Figure 9 illustrates how long
it will take each year’s group of projects to pay for themselves. Amortization of the
3

The data for figures 9 and 10 are from the Annual Energy Management Reports FY2007 to FY2011.
Conversion of returns from Bbtu to dollars was done using DoD’s average price per Btu for the given
fiscal year.
4
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project cannot be done without knowing their expected life cycle. Thus, returns on a
project in the form of reduced energy cost will only be recognized once it has paid its
capital costs.

Figure 9: DoD Energy Efficiency Projects
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Figure 10 looks only at energy efficiency projects started in FY2007 to FY2011. It
contrasts the debt DoD assumes against the projects with the anticipated returns. It
assume energy savings returns consistent with the estimate provided by the contractor,
Figure 10 approximates that projects started between FY2007 and FY2011 will have fully
repaid their capital cost by FY2021.

This simple analysis does not include additional

costs incurred for maintenance and repair of the newly installed systems. It also does not
include the impact on both cost and returns of projects that could be started after FY2011.
It does not include changes in return based on drastic changes in the price of energy.

Figure 10: Optimal Repayment Schedule For Efficiency Projects

Figure 10 shows the large upfront costs of programs and the lengthy “payback” or
“benefit” period. The benefit period is the number of years required for a project to “pay
for itself” and DoD to recoup the upfront investment. Recoupment timelines are based on
the extremely generous assumption that efficiency projects will return savings as
intended. As the NREL studies noted, however, many efficiency procedures do not result
the predicted levels of reduction. Individual behavior is extremely hard to modify. Energy
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audits of buildings might not accurately capture building energy usage or as building
purposes change, energy usage will change. Additionally, deviations in standard
weather patterns and changes to the price of commercial energy will affect returns on the
investments. Finally, expenditures for maintenance and repair of new technologies are
not captured in the initial cost estimates. Therefore, one might conclude that Figure 10
represents an optimally or “best case” recoupment schedule.
3.	
  	
  How	
  effective	
  are	
  the	
  renewable	
  energy	
  measures	
  at	
  producing	
  a	
  reliable	
  source	
  of	
  
power	
  that	
  meets	
  the	
  operational	
  needs	
  of	
  an	
  installation?	
  	
  
Understanding the value of DoD’s renewable energy measures requires an understanding
of the distribution of DoD’s renewable energy sources and the metrics being used to
measure success. According to regulations, DoD will be required to produce 25% of its
energy from renewable sources by 2025. At the present time, however, the energy
produced from DoD’s two largest renewable energy projects (China Lake Thermal Plant
and Norfolk Naval Shipyard Waste Facility) is not yet directly used by DoD but is
instead sold to local utilities. As a result, DoD is self-generating only a very small portion
of its own energy. As illustrated in Table 3, many of the renewable energy projects
produce small amounts of power. The first half of the table shows the total number of
renewable energy projects in DoD as well as the total number producing less than 100
BBtu/year (4 MW). The second half of the table shows how much energy these projects
produce in terms of percentage of DoD consumption.5
Table 3: DoD Energy Production as a Percentage of Consumption

Fiscal'Year

2011

2012

Number'of'Renewable'
Energy'Projects
476
679
Small'Production'
Projects'(<100'Bbtu/yr)
461
454
Energy'Produced'as'a'Percentage'of'DoD'Total'Annual'
Energy'Consumption
China'Lake/Norfolk
2.53%
2.61%
All'other'Projects
0.96%
1.37%
Total
3.49%
3.99%
5

The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity of
90%.
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As Table 3 further illustrates, the vast majority of DoD renewable energy projects are
small and produce less than 100 Bbtu annually. Of the 454 small projects (producing less
than 100 BBtu/year) in 2012, 91.9% produce less than 5 BBtu/year (0.19 MW). Most
provide power to very small, ancillary pieces of equipment and thus do little, if anything
to improve energy security. Major communication nodes, intelligence hubs, troop
staging locations and operational installations still draw almost all of their power from
conventional sources. Renewable sources are used sparsely to power a few outdoor lights
or perhaps heat a single building.
Table 4 is a list of major installations and an analysis of their energy demands from FY
2012. The chart illustrates that most key operational installations could be fully powered
by a facility the size of the China Lake thermal plant, which produced over 3600 Bbtu of
energy in FY 2012. Conversely, if one uses the power from all 454 small energy projects
in DoD (each producing less than 100 Bbtu/yr), the total energy produced in one year
would be 1147 Bbtu. The combined output of all the small energy projects fail to meet
the energy demands of most DoD installations.
Table 4: Installation Energy Demand Analysis

Primary&Energy&Source&
Viability

Installation,&Location

FY12&Energy&
Consumption&
(Bbtu)

China&Lake&
(3671&Bbtu)

454&Small&
Projects&
(1147&Bbtu)

Fort%Bragg,%NC
Fort%Campbell,%KY
Ft%Wainwright
Pearl%Harbor,%HI
Naval%Station%Norfolk
Florida%Keys%Air%Station%
Twenty%Nine%Palms,%CA%
Lackland%AFB,%TX%
Peterson%AFB,%CO
NSA,%Various%Locations

3491
1578
3006
846
2032
199
871
1994
2188
3042

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N

Emergency&Energy&
Viability&(25%)
Emergency& Energy&
Energy&
Source&<&
(Bbtu)
100&Bbtu
873
395
752
212
508
50
218
499
547
761

N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N

If DoD is to achieve energy security, it must produce energy on a scale that is usable. In
an energy security crisis such as a grid collapse, a natural disaster or a cyber attack, DoD
would depend on self-generated power. In the event of a crisis, DoD installations could
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limit what facilities receive power and which do not. Table 4 shows the installation
requirements for an emergency energy level set at 25% of normal demand. Assuming an
emergency energy level of 25% consumption, military installations will need a reliable
power source greater than 100 Bbtu/year. Most of DoD’s renewable energy projects
produce less than 100 BBtu per year and 91% of these projects actually produce less than
5 Bbtu in a year. The current size and scale of DoD’s renewable energy project fails to
provide an installation energy security in emergency situations.

Energy	
  Security:	
  A	
  Problem	
  Unchanged	
  
DoD will continue it efforts to reduce energy consumption and find optimal consumption
levels.. The focus of these efforts is continued improvements to existing buildings and
building energy efficiency into new buildings. As the Defense Department restructures its
force, however, consumption needs will change. A periodic assessment of power
demands and reevaluation of the 30% target goal will better aid in finding the optimal
energy demand level for the department.
However, reduction in energy usage alone will not provide protection against energy
attacks. To be secure and remain mission capable in a time of threat to national security,
the Department of Defense must have an independent, reliable source of power. In
FY2012, DoD conducted an analysis of utility outages across its installations and found
87 outages that each lasted longer than 8 hours. Figure 11 shows a breakdown of these
outages and their financial impact. The largest contributor to significant loss of power to
an installation is acts of nature. [4]

Figure 11: FY2012 Utility Outages Lasting Longer Than 8 Hours[4]
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Figure 11 focuses on outages lasting longer than eight hours. However, eight hours, in a
time of crisis, is an eternity. For example, the time from when United Airlines Flight 175
crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center to the time the building collapsed
was fifty-six minutes. Thirty minutes later the north tower collapsed.[21] During that
time, every person in America and many millions across the world watch their televisions
anxiously. New York’s first responders moved immediately, many to their own peril, to
respond to the incident. Imagine if the response had been delayed 8 hours.
Figure 12 illustrates DoD’s use of renewable energy as a percentage of total electrical
energy consumption.

Figure 12: Use of Renewable Energy as a Percentage of Electricity Use[8]

Not only is the overall percentage of renewable energy sourcing small, the majority of all
renewable energy is produced at only two locations. Further, 61% of its renewable energy
projects for FY2012 produced less than 5 BBtu/yr (0.19 MW). Given that the average
residential house in the United States has an annual energy rate of 0.0013 MW, a single 5
BBtu/yr project can power about 143 homes.[22] Clearly, such projects are ineffective in
improving energy security. Nonetheless, DoD continues to invest in micro-energy
projects, allocating just under $80 million in FY2012 for this type of renewable energy
project. The myriad of micro-energy projects not only failed to increase energy
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production to target levels, but also failed to advance any real energy security
improvements.[4]
Despite these failures in renewable energy procurement, DoD decided to embark on an
ambitious plan to meet its goals. DoD is actively exploring ways to develop renewable
energy on its installations instead of purchasing renewable energy credits. Each
department of the military (Air Force, Navy, Army) has set a goal of developing 1 GW of
power from renewable energy by 2025. DoD plans to couple its goal of 3 GW of
renewable power with efficient distribution using micro grid technology. Micro grid
technology allows an installation to not only generate its own power, but also control the
distribution and storage of that power. DoD estimates that such a system would allow a
military installation to achieve independence from conventional power resources and
reduce energy vulnerabilities.[4]
Yet improvements in grid control will do little good if the power supply is neither
constant nor sufficient. Achieving 3 GW of self-produced power is an unrealistic goal
given the current energy production model. Unless the Department of Defense considers
alterative sources of energy for on-site production, it will never achieve 3 GW of selfproduced power. It will also never truly be postured to meet the basic mission
requirements needed to support the people of the United States in the event of a state side
national crisis.
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Chapter	
  6:	
  	
  Finding	
  a	
  Solution	
  to	
  Energy	
  Independence	
  
The	
  Sustainable	
  Definition	
  of	
  Renewable	
  Energy	
  
“The Department’s vision of sustainability is to maintain the ability to operate into the
future without decline-either in the mission or in the natural and man-made systems that
support it.” (DOD SSS FY12)
The Department’s definition of sustainability has two parts; (1) protecting its ability to
operate and (2) protecting natural and man-made support systems. The World
Commission on Environment and Development describes sustainability as “meeting the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet
their own needs.” Hidden within this generalized definition of sustainable exist many
interconnect factors.[23] The first part of a sustainable energy solution for DoD is to meet
its energy needs. While DoD’s current initiatives protect future generations they fail to
allow the organization to function in the future. Failing to produce even 7% of its own
power leaves DoD vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorist attacks and cyber threats.
Increased energy production is vital to achieving energy security and to DoD developing
a sustainability strategy that is both effective and lasting.
DoD’s recently added goal to produce 3 GW of is own power by 2025 is ambitious, given
its current levels of self-generation. By comparison, Georgia Power announced in
February of 2013 that it would be shutting down 15 coal and oil fired units by April 2015.
These facilities had a combined production capability of 2.016 GW.[24] That is an
average production loss of 134 MW per plant. Only DoD’s China Lake facility rivals the
production levels of conventional plants. DoD’s current production ratio per renewable
energy project, excluding China Lake and NNS Norfolk, is 0.21 MW per project. When
only looking at small projects (less than 100 Bbtu/year produced), the ratio is even lower
at .09 MW per project. Using the more generous ratio, DoD would need 14286 projects to
produce 3 GW of power.

The Department of Defense must close the gap between its

current renewable energy production and its energy demands in order to be sustainable.

32

In order to accomplish this, a reexamination of the definition of renewable technology is
needed.6

DoD	
  Redefining	
  Renewable	
  Technology	
  To	
  Meet	
  Its	
  Needs	
  
Under its current energy strategy DoD attempts to provide sustainability using renewable
energy technology.

Figure 13: DoD Renewable Energy Projects by Type[4]

Figure 13 shows a breakdown of the renewable energy sources used by the Department of
Defense in FY 2012 for its energy security projects. EPA 2005 defines renewable
technologies as “electric energy generated from solar, wind, biomass, landfill gas, ocean
(including tidal, wave, current and thermal), geothermal, municipal solid waste or new
hydroelectric generation capacity achieved from increased efficiency or additions of new
capacity for an existing hydroelectric project” (EPA2005) The EPA 2005 definition is in
regards to how the federal government defines power consumed that is creditably toward
EPA 2005 goals. A broader definition of renewable energy comes from the Department
of Energy (DoE). DoE defines renewable energy, as
“Energy derived from resources that are regenerative or for all practical purposes can
not be depleted.” [25]
The DoE definition focuses on the sustainability aspects of renewable technology while
the EPA2005 definition simply defines types of production. The EPA2005 definition is
not intended to promote innovative and new technological developments. Instead it is
6

The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity
of 90%.
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simply to be used for the purposes of the act, as a guide for how organizations receive
renewable energy credit under the law. EPA2005 was never intended to promote energy
security on a large scale. The intent of EPA 2005 was simple to promote conservation,
reduce green house gas emissions and increase the use of currently recognized renewable
energy platforms.
To be a sustainable organization, DoD much approach energy production with a much
larger technological aperture of than limiting guidelines of EPA 2005. It must look to the
root definition of renewable and apply it to technology promote its energy needs. DoD
needs a source of power that is robust in energy output in order to sustain the small-scale
cities, which are its installations. EPA2005 technologies do not produce power on the
scale necessary to power a military installation. DoD needs a power source that operates
in a variety of climates providing a consistent source of power year round. EPA 2005
technologies work in a spattering of climates with mixed rates of production dictated by
seasonal conditions. DoD needs a technology that once in place, has a proven record of
lasting for long durations providing consistent power with little overhaul or replacement
of major components. EPA 2005 technologies are delicate and have not been shown to
provide long lasting, consistent power outputs. Finally, DoD needs a power source that
can operate in conjunction with the mission requirements of its installations without
hindering operations. The use of EPA 2005 technologies will require a selective
approach to technology implementation due to potential drastic impacts on mission
performance. Thus, to truly meet its energy needs, the Department of Defense needs to
re-evaluate its choice of renewable production technologies and find a source of long
lasting, consistent, mission compatible power. To meet the spirit of EPA 2005, this power
source must be renewable and reduce the production of green house gases.

Renewable	
  and	
  Sustainable:	
  Nuclear	
  Power	
  
As the Cold War intensified in the later half of the twentieth century, the Navy sought a
new source of power. The Navy needed a fuel for its submarine fleet so the vessels could
travel long distances without the need for extensive supply chains. In the 1950s, Admiral
H. V. Rickover of the US Navy pioneered an incredible new idea by applying atomic
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technology to the propulsion of vessels. Working closely with partners in DoE, the
Navy launched its first nuclear powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, in September of
1954. Nuclear power submariners could now stay submerged for extended periods and
were limited only by life support restrictions of the crew. By 1961, the Navy had its first
nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise. [26] Through the unique utilization
of atomic technology, Admiral Rickover drastically altered the energy vulnerability of the
Navy.

Figure 14: Ohio Class Submarine USS West Virginia [27]

Nuclear technology gave the Navy a significant operational advantage by allowing it to
conduct submerged, strategic operations for extended periods. Nuclear power allowed
the Navy to remove these vessels from extensive, costly supply lines of coal and diesel
fuel. Resupply lines were vulnerable to attack from enemy vessels and required their
own sustainment systems. The shift to nuclear power was one of the most significant
technological revolutions in marine operations.
Just as in the Cold War period, the DoD of today is once again looking to technological
solutions for its energy security and consumption challenges. Unfortunately, current
renewable initiatives to produce power have been ineffective at achieving real energy
independence. The outputs from solar arrays, wind turbines and most geothermal projects
have so far failed to meet the energy needs of a military installation. This paper suggests
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that the DoD, following the lessons learned from its past, should once again look to
nuclear energy as a sustainable solution to its power needs. Nuclear energy is reliable,
powerful, and consistent. Nuclear energy, while only producing 20% of the electricity in
the United States, is operated as the base load power producer. Nuclear power plants run
continuously at maximum production capacity and only shutdown periodically for refuel
operations. They emit no greenhouse gasses. Reactor fuel can be mined as an ore,
salvaged from demilitarized nuclear weapons or harvested from used reactor fuel.
While the United States does not conduct nuclear fuel recycling in commercial facilities,
many other countries recycle their nuclear waste. The US energy industry has not found it
economical to recycle its fuel. The “once through” fuel cycle used by commercial
operators in the United States leaves significant amounts of fissile material within the
fuel. Spent LWR fuel contains much of the U238 isotopes as originally in the fuel as well
as about 33% of the U235 isotopes. There are also recoverable plutonium isotopes.[28]
There are concerns about the proliferation of reprocessed material for improper uses,
which has led to a US political policy that opposes reprocessing efforts.

Figure 15: AREVA La Hague Reprocessing Facility in France[29]
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The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel isolates the useable isotopes from the waste
materials in the fuel. The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel reduces the amount of
nuclear waste produced by one third. [23] The current amount of commercially generated
spent nuclear fuel is about 65,000 metric tons. This approximately spans one football
field at a depth of 20 feet. [30] Viewing this as a potential resource pool, one could utilize
the spent nuclear fuel again with reprocessing and reduce the amount of waste to the size
of an NHL hockey rink at a depth of 67 feet. Spent fuel reprocessing reduces not only
the physical amount of nuclear waste but also significantly reduces the amount of
isotopes with long radioactive half-lives While the commercial nuclear industry in the
United States has not embraced reprocessing, the Defense Department does have
experience reprocessing nuclear materials for commercial use.
The technology exists to recycle the fuel for repeated uses. Nuclear energy offers DoD a
sustainable energy source that will allow installations to operate without decline in
mission capabilities caused by lack of power. Additionally, nuclear energy has minimal
impact on the environment. It emits no toxic greenhouse gases like coal or gas fired
facilities. Nuclear energy has a proven history of long-term reliability in both commercial
and defense operations.

Learning	
  from	
  the	
  Past:	
  The	
  Army	
  Nuclear	
  Power	
  Program	
  
The idea of using a nuclear reactor to provide base power and heating is not a new idea.
In the 1950s, the Army conducted a feasibly study with researchers at ORNL and
determined that a nuclear reactor could be used to provide power and heating to remote
installations. In a joint project conducted with the US Army Corps of Engineers and the
AEC, a pressurized LWR was constructed and operated at Ft. Belvoir VA for 16 years.
Over the next decade, seven reactors were built and operated. They provided heat and
power to remote locations such as outposts in Greenland and Antarctica as well as to
rural locations in the continental United States. The program even created a portable
nuclear station on a floating barge platform that eventually was used to augment power in
the Panama Canal Zone. A detailed history of the Army Nuclear Power program is found
in Appendix A.
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The Army Nuclear Power Program came to a close in the last 1960s and early 1970s.
During that time, the Defense Department was shifting resources to support a war in
Vietnam. The Army Nuclear Power Program was an expensive program because it
developed 7 reactors that were all essentially prototype designs. There was extensive
cost in the research and design of each facility as they served unique purposes.
Additionally, the commercial price of electricity was very cheap compared to price to
produce power. Despite the closure of the program, the Army had incredible success with
its some of its prototype reactors. 50 years after the end of the Army Nuclear Power
Program, military installations find themselves dependent on civilian provided power. At
the time of the Army Nuclear Power Program, Americans felt safely insulated on their
continent from the threats of a foreign enemy. Proxy wars were fought in places like
Vietnam and Afghanistan rather than on our streets. Today, the world is interconnected
through trade, information and the Internet. It is a truly global environment and
geographical separations have little impact on a determined enemy.

Figure 16: Smog Surrounding 2008 Olympic Facilities in China[31]

Additionally, at the time of the Army Nuclear Power Program, little concern was given to
the harmful effects of burning fossil fuels. There was more concern with acquiring
enough coal or gas resources to fire a plant than what harmful by-products came from the
facility. Today, the effects of fossil fuel burning are well known. Pollutants released
38

from the burring of fossil fuels are linked to increase rates of respiratory diseases such as
lung cancer. Figure 16 illustrates the dire pollution problem in China showing an image
of the 2008 Olympic facilities in China.[31] Production facilities utilizing the burning of
coal or natural gas are under increased scrutiny by the American government and a
concerned public.
The increasing threat to our commercial power supplies combined with the desire to
produce clean energy make the Army Nuclear Power Program a file in military history
which should be reexamined for potential application.
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Chapter	
  7:	
  	
  Small	
  Modular	
  Reactor:	
  A	
  New	
  Era	
  With	
  an	
  Advanced	
  
Solution	
  
Small modular reactors (SMRs) provide a flexible solution to power generation, to meet
the diverse and growing demand for clean energy. “Small” is a relative term, and the
IAEA defines SMRs as “small and medium reactors.” Power outputs for small reactors
are less than 300 MWe while medium reactors produce less than 700 MWe.[32] The
American Nuclear Society (ANS) defines Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in its position
statement #25, published in June 2011, as reactors producing less than 300 MWe.[33]
The US Department of Energy shares the same position as ANS by defining SMRs as
“nuclear power plants that [are] smaller in size (300 MWe or less) than current
generation base load plants (1000 MWe or higher)”[34]
Hence, the wide variation in production levels (ranging from a few MWe to almost 300
MWe) allows for competitive market placement of the reactors to meet the needs of a
specific community. Smaller production outputs allow for flexibility when siting and
commercializing SMRs. SMRs offer solutions to communities that exist in remote
locations. Such locations often have long supply lines for energy sources like heating oil
and are often located at the end of power transmission lines. The long supply lines
increase energy cost to remote locations and also make them prone to outages.
Additionally, remote communities or developing countries might not have the electrical
grid capacity capable of supporting a large power generation station. However, the
smaller grids would be capable of integrating a smaller electrical production facility into
their network.[35] The size and scalability of SMRs also makes them a viable
replacement for fossil fuel facilities as utility companies look to replace aging, high
polluting plants with cleaner technology that still meets needed output demands.
In addition to a more adaptable supply of electricity, the reactor facilities are modular.
The primary components of the facility are constructed in a factory, separate from the
power generation site and are then transported by highway or rail to power generation site
and installed. Though small and modular, new generation SMR designs incorporate
enhanced passive safety features as well as improved control technology. Due to the
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plant’s small size and modular construction concept, SMRs should be more economical
to produce, install and operate than the conventional base load nuclear power stations.
Alternative and cogeneration uses for SMR facilities are presently under study. For
example, district heating, desalination, hydrogen production and chemical production
could all be powered using nuclear thermal energy. A cogeneration SMR could bring not
only provide a remote, arid community stable electoral power, but it could also serve as a
heat source for desalination processes needed to supply fresh water. The size, scalability
and flexibility of SMRs make them an attractive, high potential product for the nuclear
industry.
SMR reactor technology is further broken into three distinct types of reactors: light water;
high temperature gas; and liquid metal and liquid salt cooled.

Light	
  Water	
  Reactors	
  
SMRs utilizing Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology most closely mirror the current
commercial reactor designs. Most SMR LWRs use pressurized water reactor technology
(PWR). PWRs use pressurized water as a cooling and heat transfer mechanism. They
produce steam that is then used in the production of electricity. Operating within the
thermal neutron energy spectrum, LWR designs typically use low enriched uranium for
fuel (less than 5% U235) formed in the shape of fuel pin assembly and moderated with
water. Fuel rods are grouped into bundles and arranged for optimal power density and
fuel burn-up.
The current regulatory structure is designed around the licensing of light water reactor
facilities. LWR technology has well defined mechanical, material and structural standards
for operating temperatures and pressures. Valve and pump technology is well developed
as well as advanced neutron modeling techniques. While there are some questions about
differences when licensing a SMR LWR verses a large commercial facility, it is thought
that a SMR LWR will be the easiest reactor design to license under the current regulatory
structure due to design stimulatory. Most questions involving the licensing of SMRs
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involve changes in scale due to the size of the reactor. Other questions revolve around
the licensing of individual modules verses an entire facility. Today’s licensees must
submit licenses for each reactor built. SMR developers hope to avoid licensing costs by
licensing multiple modules with one license. Figure 17 shows a conceptual design for a
NuScale SMR LWR module.

Figure 17: NuScale SMR LWR Concept[36]
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High	
  Temperature	
  Gas	
  Reactors	
  
High temperature gas reactors (HTGR) are attractive for use in process heat applications
due to their ability to produce a high temperature output. High output temperatures are
extremely important in the production of hydrogen as well as some chemicals. The
production of hydrogen on an industrial scale could be beneficial as an alternative to
fossil fuels when powering vehicles. The United States has successfully operated HTGRs
in previous years and international organization have also expressed interested in gascooled reactor technology. The current regulatory framework in the United States does
not support the licensing of gas-cooled reactors. Small HTGRs not only will be subject to
the same regulatory challenges associated with LWR SMRs related to their size and
implementation but they will also face licensing challenges based on the advanced nature
of their design. Despite the licensing challenges, they offer great flexibility for a
customer in that they are ideal for cogeneration facilities.

Liquid	
  Metal	
  and	
  Liquid	
  Salt	
  Cooled	
  Reactors	
  
Liquid metal cooled reactors utilize liquid metals such as sodium or lead as their primary
coolants. Liquid salt reactors use fluoride and chloride salts (also called molten salts) and
are also being examined as alternative coolants to water. Sodium, lead and molten salt
cooled reactors have successfully been built and operated previously in the United States
as well as aboard. These reactors have some unique safety features by virtue of using a
liquid metal or salt for cooling rather than water or a gas. They operate at low pressures
and have negative temperature void coefficients. Some molten salt designs dissolve fuel
into the liquid coolant rather than being forming it into a solid. Liquid fuel designs have
some nice passive safety features as well as being extremely proliferation proof. The
technology of molten salt reactors is of interest to those seeking a long-term solution to
the nuclear waste problem of legacy systems in the U.S. It is thought that a molten salt
reactor operating on liquid fuel could be powered using spent nuclear fuel from LWR
facilities with minimal reprocessing. Lead and sodium are both poor neutron moderators
and therefore well positioned for fast reactor operations.
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Licensing presents a major near term hurdle for liquid metal and liquid salt reactors. They
are still very much in the research stages of production and have some material
challenges to overcome. There is still research to be done in the development of materials
that are corrosion resistant as well as studying the effects of radiation on these materials
at high temperatures.

SMR	
  Applications	
  of	
  Advanced	
  Reactor	
  Technology	
  
Advanced reactor technology research is progressing despite licensing challenges. Much
of the research done in developing these reactors will help the industry as a whole. The
materials research, fuel development, and modeling methods used in advanced reactor
design will improve current designs. The research for advanced reactor technology is not
limited to reactors generating less than 300 MWe. The research is focused on developing
advanced designs beyond the LWR concept. Many of the reactor concepts developed
could be applied to a community needing an SMR. Currently there are a number of
advanced reactor designs of interest. DoE is working on its Next Generation Nuclear
Plant (NGNP), which is based off an Areava design for an HTGR. [37] Other gas-cooled
designs include the General Atomics Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR)
and the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor.[35] GE Hitachi is perusing a modular sodium
cooled reactor called PRISM.[38] Toshiba is working on a sodium reactor called 4S. The
4S reactor is a fast reactor designed to operate for 30 years without refueling.[39] At Oak
Ridge National Lab, a team is working to modify the Fluoride Salt Cooled High
Temperature Reactor (FHR) into a small version called the SM-AHTR.[40] While
advanced reactor technology is not yet technologically ready for commercialization, the
research gains made are tremendous for the industry.

Description	
  of	
  SMRs	
  Considered	
  
The following analysis compares four SMR designs. The designs studied are
1. Babcock and Wilcox mPower LWR
2. NuScale LWR
3. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy PRISM
4. Toshiba 4S
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The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the reactor design. Highlighted
features include the reactor output, coolant methods, safety measures, and refuel
intervals.
	
  
Light	
  Water	
  SMRs	
  
The two best-known SMRs thought to be ready for commercial production are Babcock
and Wilcox’s mPower reactor and NuScale Power’s SMR design. These reactor designs
gained notoriety as leaders in the field by receiving significant funding support from the
Department of Energy to develop small reactor technology. Both reactors utilize LWR
technology. Westinghouse is also developing a LWR SMR design called W-SMR.
Recent reports however indicate that Westinghouse plans to reprioritize its efforts away
from SMR technology to focus on its AP1000 large commercial PWR. The
Westinghouse change in strategy comes after twice failing to receive funding support
from the Department of Energy to promote SMR technology.[41]
MPower	
  
B&W’s mPower reactor is a small, light water reactor that integrates the latest passive
safety features into proven reactor concepts. The reactor vessel contains the core, the
control rod drive mechanism, the steam generator and the pressurizer. The core is fueled
by low enriched uranium that is similar in configuration to today’s large scale reactors.
Core reactivity is maintained through the use of control rods. The control rod drive
mechanisms are located in the lower vessel and below the pressure boundary, which
exists between the core in the lower vessel and the steam generator in the upper the
vessel. This reduces the risk of control rod ejection. Additionally the control rods have
the passive safety feature of gravity activation in the event of loss of power. Figure 18
shows the location of key components within the mPower reactor.
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Figure 18: Babcock and Wilcox mPower SMR[42]
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Light water reactors require constant cooling and thus it is paramount in an emergency
situation that the core remains covered in water. Due to the one-vessel integrated design
of the mPower reactor, all reactor coolant stays within the vessel. Figure 19 shows the
primary and secondary coolant loops of the mPower reactor. There are small penetrations
in the reactor vessel to provide for coolant sampling and letdown but they are located
well above the core. This design, coupled with a large water inventory inside the vessel,
allows for the core to remain covered in the event of an accident. There are additional
tanks within the containment building holding enough water to provide cooling for a
minimum of 7 days. The core utilizes gravity and natural circulation for cooling which
aids in removing decay heat without the use of emergency diesel generators. Finally, the
containment building itself is located below ground and is resistant to both flooding and
seismic events.

Figure 19: B&W Coolant Flow Diagram[42]
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The B&W mPower reactor produces 155 MWe (530MWth) for each module. At a height
of 83 feet and a diameter of 13 feet, the modules are very small compared to their
commercial, large-scale brethren. They are modular in construction. Movements of the
major reactor components can be done via rail or road. The mPower reactor has a
refueling interval of 4 years. The containment building also has a spent fuel pool for
cooling used fuel until it can be transferred to dry cask storage or a geologic repository.
B&W significantly reduced the size of the reactor facility. A two-module facility sits on
only 40 acres. Table 5 lists some key design characteristics of the mPower reactor.
Table 5: mPower SMR LWR Design Characteristics[43]

Feature

mPower

Thermal.Output.(MWth)
Electrical.Output.(MWe)

530
155
Diameter:-13-ft.
Height: 83 ft.
628-Tons-w/o-fuel
716 Tons w/ fuel

Vessel.Size
Vessel.Weight
Fuel.Enrichment
Fuel.Shape
Refueling.Interval
Coolant.outlet.Temp
Land.Requirements

<-5%-U235
17x17-fuel-pin-array
95 in active length
69 bundles
4-years
320-oC
40-Acres-(2Gpack)

The Tennessee Valley Authority plans to use B&W’s mPower reactor to power is SMR
reactor facility under development at Clinch River Tennessee. This will be the first SMR
reactor facility to undergo licensing, development and implementation is thought to be a
pilot project for the SMR proof of concept. [42]

NuScale	
  
The NuScale reactor is also a small light water reactor utilizing the latest in active and
passive design features to produce a safe, scalable power solution. Similar to the mPower
design, the NuScale reactor uses a standard light water reactor fuel bundle (17X17
configuration) enriched at just under 5% U235. Within the NuScale reactor vessel lies
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the core, the control rod drive mechanisms, two steam generators and the pressurizer.
The NuScale reactor utilizes natural circulation to move heated coolant water from the
core, up through the steam generator and then returns it to the core. As the heated
coolant water rises through the steam generator, it conducts heat to the secondary coolant
loop within the steam generator. It then condenses and falls back to the bottom of the
vessel with the aid of gravity and is once again heated by the core.
The reactor utilizes two passive heat removal features in the event of an emergency. The
reactor vessel sits in a reactor pool. The decay heat removal system (DHRS) removes
heat by routing coolant from the two steam generators to condensers submerged in the
reactor pool. Rather than sending steam to a generator for power production, the steam
transfers heat to the pool to aid in decay heat removal. Figure 20 illustrates the DHRS
integrated onto a NuScale reactor.

Figure 20: NuScale DHRS[36]
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The second passive heat removal feature is the emergency core systems (ECCS). It
recirculates primary coolant within the reactor vessel. As heated primary coolant rises to
the top of the vessel, vents open at the top and allow the heated water to escape (as
steam) from internal section of the reactor vessel. The steam condenses on the inside of
the exterior wall the reactor vessel and falls to the bottom. As the coolant level on the
exterior portions of the vessel rises, it aids in cooling the rector from the outside. Once
the external water level reaches the top of the vessel, vents at the bottom of the reactor
open allowing the water to circulate through the internal portions of the core and out the
top of the vessel in one loop. Figure 21 illustrates the movement of emergency cooling
utilizing the ECCS.

Figure 21: NuScale ECCS[36]
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The NuScale reactor has a power output of 45 MWe (160 MWth). The reactor vessel is
small compared to conventional plants with a single module weighting 650 tons and
standing 80 feet high. It is modular in construction and can be shipped via rail, road or
barge. The physical size of the reactor facility is very small. A reactor facility containing
12 modules (540 MWe production) sits on a facility that is only 44 acres.
Due to the power output of the NuScale plants, they are very adaptable to the needs of a
community. Configurations of up to 12 modules can be linked to support the specific
needs of a community. Table 6 illustrates some of the key characteristics of a NuScale
Module.
Table 6: NuScale Reactor Characteristic Summary[44]

Feature

NuScale

Thermal+Output+(MWth)
Electrical+Output+(MWe)

160
45
Diameter:.15.ft.
Height: 80 ft.

Vessel+Size
Vessel+Weight
Fuel+Enrichment
Fuel+Shape
Refueling+Interval
Coolant+outlet+Temp
Land+Requirements

650.tons.as.shipped
Standard.LWR.fuel.(<5%.
U235)
17x17.fuel.rod.assembly
78 in length
24.months
44.Acres.(12.Module)
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A NuScale reactor has a 24-month refuel interval. The unique design of the NuScale
reactor facility allows for simultaneous refuel and power production operations. Figure
22 illustrates the layout of a 12 module NuScale reactor facility with refueling bay and
spent fuel pool.[36]

Figure 22: 12 Module NuScale Reactor Facility Layout[36]

To refuel a module, it is physically removed from the reactor bay and placed in the
refueling bay. There, it is isolated from the operating reactor modules. In the refuel bay
it undergoes refuel and maintenance operations. The integrated, continuous refuel cycle
of the NuScale facility reduces the impact of refuel operations on the plant operator.
Rather than occasionally shutting down to conduct large scale refuel operations, the
operator utilizes a small specially trained team that focuses only on continuous refuel
operations.

Liquid	
  Metal	
  
PRISM	
  
The PRISM reactor is a sodium fast reactor (SFR). GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, as part
of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), is developing it as a solution to spent
nuclear fuel challenges. The goal of the GNEP is to develop an Advanced Recycling
Center (ARC) to reprocess used nuclear fuel. The PRISM reactor is a central component
of the recycle process, as it would operate on the recycled fuel.
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The PRISM core has metallic fuel. The fuel is formed within the recycling center. The
composition of the fuel and its configuration within the core will change depending on
the mission of the PRISM reactor. PRISM missions could include the recycle of
actinides, breeding fuel or consuming highly enriched fuel from nuclear weapons. The
PRISM is intended to be a solution to many different nuclear fuel cycle challenges. The
primary mission of the PRISM is intended to be spent fuel recycle.

Figure 23: PRISM Coolant Loops and Balance of Plant[38]

The PRISM has three independent coolant loops as seen in Figure 23. The primary
coolant loop uses sodium to cool the core and transfers heat to an intermediate sodium
coolant loop. Heat transfer between the loops occurs within the containment vessel. The
intermediate loop acts as an interface to the power generation portion of the plant. It
transfers heat to tertiary coolant loop containing water. This loop is then used to make
steam and provide power. There are a number of leak detection and isolation systems
used to prevent the incursion and mixing of coolant or air between the loops.
The PRISM has a power output of 311 MWe, which is slightly higher than the ANS
definition of an SMR. The ARC design calls for the operation of six PRISM modules.
By having six modules the ARC has maximum flexibility. It has multiple fuel recycle
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platforms, each configurable for the type of spent fuel in need of processing. Each
PRISM can be configured to support and different fuel recycling mission and they can be
operated simultaneously. While its design is not intended for use as a stand-alone
facility, it does present a viable design concept for building a small scale SFR.[38]

4S	
  
The Super-Safe, Small, and Simple (4S) sodium cooled reactor is being designed by
Toshiba Corporation and the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
(CRIEPI). Its intended purpose is to support extremely remote locations and operate
continuously without refuel for 30 years. Because the reactor is intended for use in
remote locations, it is design to operate with very little maintenance and supervision. The
reactor has an output of 10 MWe (30 MWth). It is modular in construction and can be
transported by barge. Due to its small size, single fuel load and minimal operating costs,
this reactor is very economical. The reduced cost of the reactor make it a possible
candidate to provide long term power to small, remote locations.
The 4S is a sodium fast reactor that uses metallic fuel consisting of 18% enriched U235.
The fuel is formed into metallic fuel pins. These pins are typically one of the lifetime
limiting factors of a reactor. The cladding on fuel pins is susceptible to thermal creep.
The 4S fuel pins mitigate this with thick cladding as well as a central gas plenum within
the pin. This gas plenum is what enables the reactor to have a much longer lifetime than
the typical reactor. Figure 24 illustrates the location of the glass plenum within the
metallic fuel pin.

Figure 24: 4S Fuel Pin Configuration with Gas Plenum[39]

Reactivity is controlled through the combined use of a reflector and a fixed central
absorber. By balancing the position of these features, the reactive can be controlled with
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course movements for startup and shutdown as well as fine movements to balance burn
up. There is also a shutdown rod in the center of the core that can be used for emergency
shutdown. Either the removal of the reflector or the insertion of the shutdown rod is
capable of providing the necessary negative reactivity to shut the core down on its own.
The 4S uses a three-coolant loop system similar to the PRISM reactor. The primary
sodium loop is used to cool the core and is internal to the core vessel. The intermediate
loop transfers heat from the core using sodium to the tertiary loop containing water. The
tertiary loop is used to produce steam and makes electricity. All loops have leak
detection and isolation features.
The 4S has several passive heat removal systems. The Intermediate Reactor Auxiliary
Cooling systems (IRACS) uses air to cool the intermediate loop. Heat is removed from
the core using the primary to intermediate loop interface. The IRACS then uses air,
instead of water from the tertiary loop, to cool the intermediate loop. This air moves via
natural circulation and vents excess heat into the atmosphere. It is an emergency system
and is only intended for accident scenarios. The IRACS interfaces between the
intermediate and tertiary loops. Figure 25 shows the location of the IRACS.

Figure 25: 4S Passive Reactor Safety Systems IRACS and RVACS[39]
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The Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) removes heat by transferring
directly it from the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel is surrounded by cylindrical heat
collector, which is filed with air. Ambient air circulates within the collector providing
decay heat transfer and removal from the reactor vessel. The heat from the heat collector
is discharged via exhaust stacks. Figure 25 shows the RVACS location within the plant
as well as a close-up of RVACS air circulation within the cylindrical heat collector. Both
systems operating alone provide enough cooling to keep with fuel within material safety
standards.[39]

Assessment	
  of	
  SMRs	
  using	
  Evaluation	
  Criteria	
  
I assessed each reactor design by rank ordering each design based on 9 assessment
criteria. The following paragraphs define the assessment criteria. The full analysis of
each reactor and its score for each criterion is found in Appendix B.
1. Safety
2. Power Output
3. Physical Size
4. Refueling Cycle
5. Licensing
6. Public Acceptance
7. Fuel Cost
8. Maturity of Technology
9. Process Heat Applications

Safety	
  
Safety considerations are paramount when choosing an SMR design. Many reactors
utilize both passive and active safety features. Having maximum passive safety features
in the design is optimal. Advanced reactor designs maximize massive safety features.
Some reactor designs are more prone than others to certain types of accidents. For
example, LWR operate at high pressures to keep their coolant from boiling. Highpressure operations make LWR more prone to loss of pressure accidents than their liquid
metal counterparts operating at low pressures. Companies conduct probabilistic risk
analysis on their designs as they seek to license them. Those designs, which have
complete or are near-complete analysis are preferable over those that are still testing their
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designs. If a reactor has a functioning prototype with a proven safety history, this is also
advantageous.
Power	
  Output	
  
The amount of power produced by the reactor must meet the needs of the Department of
Defense. Furthermore, it must be able to meet both electrical generation needs and have
the capacity for utilization in process heat applications. Many designs match desired
output needs by increasing or decreasing the number of individual modules. An increase
in modules leads to an increase in overall cost as well as facility complexity. A balance
needs to be achieved by using the correct number of modules to meet installation needs.
Physical	
  Size	
  
The size of the reactor facility is very important. Military installations can be vast
expanses of training grounds or restricted access, fenced locations nestled in the heart of
a population center. Encroaching on civilian land would be both unpopular and expensive
for the Department of Defense. Siting within the perimeter of a current installation would
potentially reduce the amount of land available for training. Minimizing the size impact
of the reactor on installation military operations is extremely important.
Refueling	
  Cycle	
  
The refuel cycle of the reactor is important to installation operations. If the reactor
provides sole power for the installation, it is important that an alternate supply of power
is available for the base during refuel outages. This is of particular importance if the
reactor must be taken offline for extended periods.
Licensing	
  
The NRC’s current licensing framework is structured by the assumption that the projects
to be supported for development are large, stationary light water reactors. Many of the
regulatory requirements for developers are driven by these assumptions. With the
increasing interest in SMR applications and technology, the NRC is working to adjust its
regulatory framework to support a more flexible design. The NRC developed several
new offices to aid in the licensing of SMRs. The NRC staff is hoping to review SMR
designs and find generic resolutions to policy, regulatory and key technical issues related
to these designs. In addition, there are issues that arise specific to each application.
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Issues such as how to handle the licensing of a process heat application, the licensing of a
single or multi-module facility, and the appropriate size of the emergency planning zone
(EPZ) all will require the development of a new regulatory framework. As designs drift
further from the standard LWR reactor, the NRC must continue to ensure the safety of the
public while promoting innovation and flexibility. Large deviations from the traditional
LWR design include the use of TRISO fuel particles, fuel enrichments greater than 5%,
and alternative choices for primary coolant methods.[35] The American Nuclear Society
position statement 25 which covers SMRs encourages the NRC to
“enable timely adoption of SMR designs by assisting in the identification and resolution
of generic SMR licensing issues as well as by establishing the most efficient and effective
licensing approaches”[33]
TVA’s Clinch River Project is of extreme importance to the nuclear industry in United
States. As energy providers to look consider using nuclear SMR technology as an option
to modernize their fleet, there are many attractive economical and environmental
characteristics. The nuclear industry is highly regulated. Developers are fearful to
commit large capital investments into a technology that has a history of high regulation
when that regulatory framework is still in development. An open, honest dialogue
between the site developer, the reactor manufacturer and the NRC will result in
reductions in ambiguity and the establishment of SMR licensing precedent for years to
follow.
Pubic	
  Acceptance	
  
DoD installations work closely with the communities that surround them to build
cohesive relationships. The communities surrounding an installation, which chooses to
install a nuclear power source, will face many questions about the safety of the facility
and its impact on the community. DoD should strive to pick a reactor that will be readily
accepted by the public. Forecasting public concerns and being prepared to counter those
concerns with demonstrated, safe technology will increase the likelihood of public
acceptance for a nuclear powered military installation.
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Fuel	
  Costs	
  
The expense of nuclear fuel and its transportation is a factor is reactor selection. Fuel
costs are influenced by manufacturing difficulty, resource availability and the refuel
cycle. Increased refuel intervals increases the cost of operation for the facility. A unique
fuel design, like TRISO fuel, will be costly if not yet produced on a commercial scale.
Additionally, a reactor requiring refuel often will have increased fuel burdens. The
installation will often shift operations to accommodate the transportation fuel to the
facility. Given the sensitive nature of nuclear fuel, transportation operations will require
special protocols and procedures.
Maturity	
  of	
  Technology	
  
DoD needs a solution to its energy security challenges as soon as possible. There are
many innovative reactor designs that exist either on paper or are still in the initial stages
of testing. Many reactors were developed in the middle of the 20th century but have not
been operated in recent years. These designs are viable but still need extensive testing.
Designs with more maturity will be easier to for DoD to implement quickly.
Process	
  Heat	
  Applications	
  
Being able to use nuclear heat for applications other than electricity gives DoD flexibility
in developing future energy solutions. A military installation nuclear reactor should have
the capacity to support both electricity production and process heat applications.

The	
  Small	
  Modular	
  Reactor	
  For	
  DoD	
  
Advanced reactor technology offers the greatest long-term potential for the Department
of Defense. The passive safety features of liquid metal or salt cooled reactors make them
a vastly superior design to the standard LWR design. They have great potential for use as
a nuclear waste solution as well as being used for power applications. They offer
excellent resistance to proliferation. HTGRs offer the most potential for process heat
applications. These reactors can reach extremely high temperatures, which could be
useful in producing hydrogen on an industrial scale. If hydrogen fuel technology
continues to advance, these reactors could play a key role in helping the defense industry
wean itself from its annual $16 billion fuel bill.[6]
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Figure 26: Coated Particle Fuel Development Lab at ORNL

Most advanced reactor technology is still in the development and testing stages. Many
reactors have further research needed in materials development, fuel enhancement, and
modern modeling techniques. As these advanced designs are optimized, they must
undergo extremely rigorous probabilistic risk analysis in order to satisfy the safety
requirements of the U.S. nuclear industry. Work is being done across the country in DoE
labs as well as at universities to find solutions to these challenges. Figure 26 shows the
Coated Particle Fuel Lab at ORNL which works on developing improved solid fuel
designs for advanced reactors.[45]
International organizations are also aggressively working on advanced reactor
technologies. In his 2011 testament before the U.S. Senate, Joe
Calvin, then president of the ANS, noted
“The nuclear supply infrastructure has become thoroughly internationalized in the last
three decades…it is clearly preferable to have U.S. involvement in the global nuclear
marketplace, rather than ceding the territory to non-US suppliers that may not always
share our approach toward safety and nonproliferation.”[46]
The research conducted will be used to support the licensing and construction of
prototype and test facilities. Once researchers construct a prototype and the NRC
develops a regulatory framework, the designs will be more attractive to commercial
developers and investors.
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However, the Department of Defense needs a solution to its energy security
vulnerabilities now. As the defense industry becomes more technical and energy
dependent, installations require a continuous source of power to conduct even the most
basic of military operations. The rising threat from cyber security attacks as well as
natural disasters make military installations increasingly vulnerable. Even a simple,
physical attack could cripple a military installation if targeting its electrical supply lines.
DoD is aggressively seeking solutions to reduce its energy demand by spending almost
$1 billion annually on reduction initiatives. While these efforts are somewhat effective,
simply turning off more lights, unplugging coffee pots and changing climate control
settings fail to match the rising real energy consumption of the armed forces.
The military becomes more reliant on technology daily. Gone are the days of a military
signal corps using flags and smoke to pass messages. Today, commanders at even the
lowest level carry smartphones and provide daily status reports via automated reporting
systems. The signal corps long since retired its flags and replaced them with Joint
Network Nodes capable of establishing communication and Internet links in remote,
austere locations. A private on a remote hilltop in Afghanistan can send an enemy status
report to his headquarters at Bagram Airfield as easily and often as a college student
checks social media. Resupply requests, movement orders and personnel evaluations, are
all delivered electronically. Meetings are conducted in person as well as via video
teleconference linking commanders in locations all across the world.

Figure 27: Joint Network Node[47]
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Without a steady supply of power, military operations come to an abrupt stop.
Implementation of SMR technology today, prior to full commercialization, provides DoD
an immediate, reliable power supply.
While advanced reactor technology is attractive because of its potential, small modular
light water reactors are expected to be in commercial operation in the very near future. In
February 2013, TVA and B&W signed an agreement to pursue licensing an SMR facility
at Clinch River. With DoE financial support of $452 million in funding over five years,
50% of the licensing and design costs will be funded by DoE. DoE hopes to have the
mPower design certified by the NRC by 2015 and a commercial demonstration of SMRs
by 2022.[48] The progress shown by TVA, B&W and NuScale in partnership with DoE
and the NRC shows promise for the world of small modular reactors. SMRs can bring
safe, reliable, clean power to American in a scalable format to fit the needs of each
community. They are ideal suited to fit the varied needs of the Department of Defense as
it seeks to eliminate its energy Achilles heel.
Indeed SMRs might also be at least part of the solution to DoD’s energy security
problem. However, in speaking with an official from the Army Office for Installations,
Energy and Environment it is clear that DoD does not want to be a prototype validator for
a new energy technology. Rather, DoD prefers to leave such innovation to its partners in
DoE.[49] This does not mean however, that the Defense Department is not open to new
ideas. The Defense Department routinely applies new technology in unique ways as it
adapts technology for military use. In applying nuclear technology to power its
installations, the Department of Defense must be very conscious of public opinion.
Military installations already receive a great deal of public scrutiny due to the unique
nature of the operations conducted on installations. Military installations do their best to
coexist tranquilly with their neighbors and the military often conducts more disruptive
maneuvers at installations far removed from civilian population sectors. When
implementing a new energy strategy on its installations that capitalized on the benefits of
nuclear power, the military would need to carefully select its reactor choice. A reactor
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design that has the full support of DoE, the NRC and is in use in a commercial facility
will be far more publically acceptable than an advanced, prototype design.
Appendix B contains an assessment of each SMR considered for use in an energy
solution for the Department of Defense. Table 7 from that Appendix is below. The table
contains the decision assessment rankings used for selecting the SMR. The assessment
evaluation takes into consideration the unique purpose and constraints associated with
using a nuclear reactor to power a DoD installation. Each reactor is rank ordered from
one to four with a score of one being given to the reactor design that is most apt to
meeting the needs of DoD given the individual criterion. The criteria are equally
weighted. The reactor with the lowest score is best suited for a DoD energy security
solution.
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Table 7: SMR Assessment Criteria Rating

Reactor

mPower NuScale PRISM

4S

Safety

3

2

4

1

Power/Output

1

2

3

4

Physical/Size

2

3

4

1

Refueling/Cycle

2

3

4

1

Licensing

1

2

4

3

Public/
Acceptance

1

2

4

3

Fuel/Costs

1

2

4

3

Maturity/of/
Technology

1

2

4

3

Process/Heat/
Applications

1

3

2

4

Score

13

21

33

23
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The mPower reactor is the best available SMR design for the Department of Defense.
The amount of energy needed on a military base to secure its installation energy future is
not enormous. Most installations have all their electricity needs met by a reactor that
produces less than 100 MWe. A single mPower reactor produces 130 MWe while a
NuSclae module produces 45 MWe. The power capacity of an mPower facility gives
installations maximum flexibility on how they operate the reactor. If running at full
capacity, the installation can sell unused, excess power to a local utility. It can operate at
reduced capacity and decrease its burn rate, which will extend its lifetime. When
operating at 90% capacity, the reactor does not require refuel for 4 years. Due to the
military application of the facility, designers could present a modified design that uses a
fuel with a higher level of enrichment so as to further increase time between refueling.
Naval vessels run on highly enriched fuel allowing them extremely long operation
intervals between refueling.
NuScale technology is capable of increasing power output by increasing the number of
modules in the facility. This would allow DoD some flexibility in how it sited the
reactors on each installation. NuScale modules require frequent refueling at 24 months.
Their multi-module approach does offer the capability of conducting refuel operations
without shutting down the entire facility. A frequent refuel interval will produce more
waste than an mPower facility requiring on-site storage in either spent fuel pools or dry
casks. This is not ideal for a military installation on which space is precious commodity.
Designers could look at the effects of increasing the level of fuel enrichment on a
NuScale design as well to see if the refuel interval could be increased.
With its current design, an mPower SMR is perfectly suited to meet the Department of
Defenses installation energy needs and any future demand increases. As DoE, TVA,
B&W and the NRC validate the mPower design and put it into application at Clinch
River, DoD should look closely at how to apply the reactor facility to military use. The
following paragraphs present how an mPower reactor would be applied for us on a
military installation.
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Chapter	
  8:	
  	
  m2Power:	
  A	
  Military	
  Modular	
  Reactor	
  to	
  Meet	
  DoD’s	
  
Needs	
  
A modular military reactor provides a sustainable solution to DoD’s energy security
vulnerabilities. An m2Power reactor is a B&W mPower reactor modified to serve the
needs of a military installation. In examining the impact of an m2Power reactor on a
military installation, there are multiple considerations. Many of these factors are the
same as used when analyzing the impact of renewable energy sources on installations.
Some considerations are

•

Power Output

•

Process Heat Applications

•

Physical Size

•

Mission Impact

•

Environment

•

Security

•

Reactor Accident Impact on Military Operations

•

Military Accident Impact on Reactor Operations

•

Manning and Management

•

Transportation

•

Waste Management

The following paragraphs examine each of these considerations and the impact of an
SMR operating on a military installation.

Power	
  Output	
  
Military installations are in essence small cities. They have their own fire protection and
police force. Most have a hospital or medical facility. There are full time residents who
live in military housing on the installation. Some residents are single and live in soldier
barracks while others are families living in duplexes or single-family homes. The vast
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majority of the buildings are used to support or sustain military operations. These
buildings range from office buildings, to mechanical support facilities to physical fitness
centers. There are also a number of small businesses on a military installation such as
fast food restaurants, grocery stores and gas stations.
The power demands of the installation are proportionally related to its size and
geographic location. Figure 28 shows the MW usage of some military installations
previously discussed.
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Figure 28: Select Installation Power Demands (MW) FY 2012 [4]

The installation consuming power at the largest rate is FT Bragg, NC. It consumed power
at an annual rate of approximately 130 MW in 2012. Fort Bragg is operational a very
large military installation. It houses the headquarters of some of the largest components
of the military. It has approximately 57,000 military personnel, 11,000 civilians and
23,000 family members making a small city with a population just under 100,000
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personnel. It is one of the largest military complexes in the world.[50] Its high power
demands are possibly attributed to the amount of personnel operating daily at the
installation. Other installations with high power needs can be found in extreme climates.
Fort Wainwright Alaska and Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado both have high power
demands at 112 MW and 81 MW respectively.7
These figures represent the highest energy demands for installations in the military.
Thus, it is possible to use a reactor smaller than a conventional power facility to support
an installation. Installations within DoD could be support by a reactor producing 150
MWe such as the mPower reactor. Many have consumption levels less than 100 MW.
Installations with less electoral demand could put excess energy toward process heat
applications or the military could sell the energy back to a local utility. The size and type
of energy demands on a military installation make them ideally suited for the use of an
m2Power reactor.
Process	
  Heat	
  Applications	
  
In recent years, the need for process heat in industrial applications rose significantly. In
2012, the IAEA released the results of a study about the use of nuclear power in process
heat applications. The study focused on the use of high temperature gas reactors. The
goal was to determine if nuclear power could be used in the process heat applications
requiring the highest thermal energies. One of the most environmentally significant of
these applications is the production of hydrogen, which requires a reactor output coolant
temperature greater than 700oC. Hydrogen is thought to be considered an viable possible
alternative to fossil fuels in vehicles as well as being an excellent large scale energy
storage medium.
Another useful application of thermal energy is in nuclear desalination. Nuclear
desalination is a low temperature reaction occurring at coolant output temperatures from
100 oC to 140 oC. Other desalination processes use fossil fuels to provide thermal energy
and have significant greenhouse gas emissions and costs associated with pollution
7

The energy to power conversion rate is based on a 24-hour day, 365-day year and a production capacity
of 90%.
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control. Desalination technology is used in countries with limited access to fresh water
but access to salt water sources.
District heating is useful in providing heat to communities existing in extremely cold
climates. District heating uses reactor output coolant temperatures of 80 oC to 150 oC.
District heating is most effective in small communities where the produced heat does not
have to travel long distances (less than 5 km). A small community district heat network
is sustainable with 10-50 MW(th).
Other applications of nuclear generated process heat include oil recovery and the
production of chemicals. Oil recovery operations using nuclear produced steam appears
to be most successful in extraction of oil from sand. A CANDU cogeneration facility
could be useful in extracting oil from Canadian oil sands and providing electricity when
oil production is low. Chemical industries use process heat for a wide variety of
applications, which require the splitting of hydrocarbons. This is a key step in the
production of gas and hydrogen. Figure 29 illustrates a wide variety of industrial process
heat applications and the output coolant temperatures needed to conduct these
applications. [51]

Figure 29: Chemical Production Process Heat Requirements [52]
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It is unlikely that the military will use process heat in a chemical production method. The
military itself produces very little of its own supplies. It relies heavily on an extensive
supply chain, which runs continuously to provide the products necessary to meet its
needs. The military supply system is almost entirely devoted to procurement rather than
production. While an m2Power reactor will not reach the temperatures needed to
produce most chemicals or hydrogen, in future years, advanced SMRs will be able to
reach the desired outputs. Should hydrogen become a viable alternative to petroleum for
vehicle and aircraft operations, the military might want to consider internally producing
it. By establishing the policies and procedures for reactor operations early, the military
would be positioned to capitalize on the industrial production of hydrogen giving it
operational energy independence.
Process heat applications of an m2Power reactor could be useful to a military installation
based on environmental considerations. Some of the largest energy consuming
installations in DoD reside in extremely cold climates. Energy created by an m2Power
reactor could be used in a cogeneration capacity on installations located in these extreme
climates. Fort Wainwright Alaska has average low temperatures below freezing for more
than half the year. [53]It is a relatively small installation with only about 3400 acres (13.8
2

km ) owned by the federal government. [54] Depending on the allocation of that
property, it is likely that the central living and work facilities on the installation are in
close proximity to each other. This type of installation would be ideal for the use of an
electricity and district heating cogeneration m2Power reactor.
In addition, military retains within its assets water purification equipment. This
equipment depends on an existing supply of water. Efforts are being made to find
technology that could use desalination technology to aid in supporting the project of
forces into arid climates. A theoretical small, portable nuclear reactor could provide
foreword-deployed forces with the power needed to run electrical equipment as well
desalinate water. While an m2Power facility is to a large to be considered truly mobile by
military standards, using reactor technology on permanent installations in arid locations
could help an installation becoming entirely Net Zero. Not only could the facility
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provide electricity, it could also provide water for installation use. Using an m2Power
reactor in this capacity reduces two major sustainment vulnerabilities for the installation.
Physical	
  Size	
  
Conventional nuclear power plants occupy enormous amounts of physical space.
Southern Company’s nuclear power plant, Vogtle Unit 1 and 2, sits on a 3200-acre site
34 miles southeast of Augusta Ga. That is an incredible expanse of land used to support a
single facility that is designed to produced over 2400 MW of power.[55] It is unrealistic
to expect a plant of this to operate on a military installation. By comparison, TVA’s is
planning to use a 1200-acre site for its Clinch River project. At Clinch River, TVA will
be prepared to install multiple small modular reactors, each with an output of about 180
MW.[56] B&W claims that a two-pack m2Power reactor could occupy a site the size of
40 acres (.16 km2). This is an incredibly small footprint and is advantageous to a military
installation that might be limited on size by geological or man-made boundaries. A
single SMR could occupy an even smaller footprint.
The size of the geographic footprint of the reactor facility plays a large role in both
installation and reactor selection. Some installations occupy vast expanses of land and
are far removed from civilian populations. Fort Irwin California is home to the National
Training Center in Southern California. It is an expansive reservation of land used to
conduct large scale military exercises. It is far removed from any metropolitan area. By
contrast, Joint Base Lewis-McCord (JBLM) is an installation that is nestled in the I-5
corridor just south of Tacoma, WA and less than an hour from Seattle. While the
potential for SMR site development could exist at Ft. Irwin in the California desert, it is
unlikely that even a reactor facility as small as .16 km2 would be suitable for at Joint Base
Lewis-McCord due to the population density. Due to its physical size constraints, JBLM
conducts much of its large-scale maneuver and weapons training at a remote facility near
Yakima WA. The Yakima training center would be more suited, due to its size and
location, for the use of an m2Power reactor facility.
Another consideration when locating an SMR on a military installation is the impact of
the exclusion zone.[57] The NRC requires that all reactors have a defined exclusion zone
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and low-population zone. An exclusion area means that the licensee has “the authority to
determine all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel or property from the
area.” This does not, however, prohibit movement within the zone. The NRC clearly
states that the area may be traversed by highway, rail or water as long as they do not
interfere with plant operations.[58] If the facility is location on an installation, then
installation commander will have complete authority over exclusion zone authorization.
In addition, military installation occupants are familiar with locations on installations that
have limited or restricted access. These areas are usually well marked, monitored and at
times physically guarded. Controlling access in and around the facility should not impact
training or operations as long as the site chosen allows for maximum flexibility of tenet
units.
The low population zone is an area containing residents where the
“total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that
appropriate protective measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious
accident.”
In the case of a low-population zone, there are no defined numeric guidelines.[58]
Christofer Mowry, the president of B&W mPower, claims the size and passive safety
features of the mPower r reactor can reduce such a zone to as small as half a mile.[59]
Much of the size depends on how quickly an area can responds to an accident. In the case
of a military installation, on post residents and employees are routinely subject to
emergency planning and security drills. Incorporating nuclear accident scenario
planning would follow already established similar protocols. In addition, timeliness of
the response will be greatly improved over a commercial plant because the
communication structure of the military is streamlined through a single command
channel. In a commercial facility, reactor operators must coordinate with multiple state
and local agencies for support. Military installation occupants are already trained and
familiar with mass information distribution processes.
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Mission	
  Impact	
  
The impact on mission performance is the most important factor when selecting a
military installation for the use of SMR technology. As with other forms of renewable
energy, the SMR cannot detract from the organizations ability to train and conduct its
mission. Much of the mission impact of an SMR can be mitigated through procedural
changes. For example, an installation with high levels of rotary wing or fixed wing air
traffic might have to modify approach and departure corridors to avoid over flight of an
SMR facility. This is not at all unusual for aircraft pilots as they commonly directed to
avoid over flight of facilities. Alternatively they could be allowed to overly the facility
but only above certain altitudes.

Figure 30: Considerations for reactor placement; military helicopter training [60]

Using an SMR to power a geographically large, remote training center like Ft. Irwin is
ideal. Much of the FT Irwin reservation is an open maneuver facility that allows freedom
of movement for tanks, personnel carriers and vehicles. These vehicles would simply
need to avoid the SMR facility. These types of restrictions are familiar to military
planners and have little impact on mission execution. In fact, at times they represent real-
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world scenarios where an invading force might chose to avoid an area so as to preserve
historical or religious significance. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, many mosques were
restricted targets because they were of religious significance to the local population.
Additionally the facility could add to an aspect of military training that is not currently
emphasized. The potential for conflict with a nuclear powered or nuclear-armed country
is possible for the US Military. While it would be unwise to use an existing, operating
facility as a location for conducting military training, there is some value from having to
include it in operational planning. By forcing military planners to incorporate real, rather
than simulated, nuclear facility impacts into the mission development process, the
scenarios used for training will be a more realistic simulation of the potential future
conflicts.
To develop a reactor site on an installation, developers must interface closely with their
military partners. The developers must have a full and complete understanding of the
installation operations. They must ensure that the military is aware of all possible
impacts on performance. Finally, site developers must understand that on a military
installation, the base commander holds the final decision authority. He or she will
consider many factors when siting a reactor facility. Developers must be open and
understanding of his or her concerns.

Environment	
  
The environmental conditions impacting a military installation will be a key factor in site
selection. The military gains the most economical benefit by selecting an installation that
not only has a high electrical energy demand but also has an overall high energy
consumption due to environmental factors. Extreme weather conditions are commonly
found at military installations. Locations like Ft Wainwright Alaska and Ft Drum New
York are known for being very cold. Alternatively, the Twenty-Nine Palms, CA or Ft.
Bliss Texas record some of the highest temperatures at military installations. Installations
in extreme cold climates could benefit from the district heating capabilities of an SMR
cogeneration facility. Installations having high power demands for heating or cooling
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which is located the end of transmission lines might find it more cost effective to simply
produce their own power. The environment will shape which installations are good
candidates for SMR technology in a similar way that it shapes siting for commercial
reactor locations. Environmental risks to SMRs are similar to the risks to commercial
reactors. Installations prone to high seismic activity should be avoided. Facilities
threated by high tidal swells or hurricane activity must mitigate these risks with severe
weather plans, increased facility hardening and back-up systems. Many of the same tools
used to analyze environmental risks to commercial reactors will apply to the placement of
SMRs.
Security	
  
“Nuclear power plants continue to be among the best-protected private sector facilities
in the Nation.” –NRC[58]
NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 73 governs the physical protection requirements of plants
and materials. The NRC requires the use of an extensive security network to ensure the
safeguards of our nations nuclear facilities. It states that facilities are
“well-protected by physical barriers, armed guards, intrusion detection systems, area
surveillance systems, access controls, and access authorization requirements for
employees working inside the plants.”[58]
Siting it on a military installation would enhance reactor security. Military installations
are limited access. They have access control points at all locations. Figure 31 shows an
access control point at Ft. Campbell, KY.[61]

Figure 31: Military Installation Access Control Point
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Installations are surrounded by physical barrier systems. Manned security patrols operate
24 hours a day year round. Individual units on the installations each have their own
security patrols, which operate after business hours to ensure basic physical security
measures are in place. The military provides continuous security on its installation due to
the concentration of weapons, equipment and ammunition stored on site. Personnel are
trained in the detection of unusual behavior as well as how to report and respond to
threats. Installations conduct annual drills emphasizing force protection and each
origination has planned measures to take in the event of a threat or attack on the
installation. Individual buildings on the installation have limited access due to the nature
of the building, which require identification checks, badging, and other security protocols.
Members of the armed services are familiar with operating in a security centric
environment.
Facility security could be provided by armed service members or outside contractors. It
is not unusual for DoD to use contracted security on its installations. Many installations
have contracted gate security officers and police forces. Using a contracted security force
would allow for guards to receive specialize training on reactor specific threats. The use
of contractors would also be much less costly to the Defense Department, which would
not have to train and develop a specialized force of reactor security personnel. The
interface between reactor security personnel and installation security forces would be
similar to the procedures used on installations with contracted gate security forces.

Reactor	
  Accident	
  Impact	
  on	
  Military	
  Operations	
  
The impact of a reactor accident on the installation will be the one of the most important
concerns to an installation commander. Of primary concern to the commander will be
the physical impact on installation personnel. Additionally, he or she will need to know
how an incident will impact military operations.
Clear and complete reactor accident analysis is integral to all forms of nuclear reactor
development. It will be no different when siting a reactor on a military installation. The
NRC mandates the study of effects of a reactor incident on the local population. The
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most important metric in this analysis is the possible dose given to the population. In
addition, an installation commander will need to know the evacuation requirements. He
or she will want to know if and when reentry onto the installation is possible. The
military will not allow for a scenario that renders the base and all its equipment unusable
for a long period of time.
Safety features on the m2Power reactor significantly reduce the likely hood of accidents.
As the design completes the NRC certification process, probabilistic risk analysis will
validate these features. All nuclear processes adhere to the double contingency principle
meaning that no single event should be cause for failure. The industry applies “defense
in depth” to all designs requiring multiple redundancies for systems. Many reactor
systems employ passive features that cause the reactor to dissipate heat or shut down with
no action from the operator. Additionally, reactors contain active controls that trigger
immediate shutdowns in the event of abnormal or questionable conditions. Accidents are
mitigated through routine and extensive training. Training teaches operators how to
respond to recognize and prevent an accident. The nuclear industry is the safest power
industry in America due in part to the extensive training undergone by operators.
Military personnel conduct training on a daily basis. Some events are at the individual
level while others can include thousands of personnel and pieces of equipment. The
military is exceptional at planning, resourcing and conducting training. The
incorporation of a nuclear training program on a military installation would be nested
within the overall training plans for the base.

Military	
  Accident	
  Impact	
  on	
  Reactor	
  Operations	
  
Unique to the challenges facing SMR site selection on a military installation is the
potential impact military munitions accidents on the reactor. Risks associated with the
impact of a military accident must be closely examined. This will be one of the largest
and probably most publically discussed risks associated with military reactor power.
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The NRC mandates the examination of the potential hazards from military facilities in 10
CFR 100.21(e).
“Military facilities must be evaluated and site characteristics established such that
potential hazards from such routes and facilities will pose no undue risk to the type of
facility proposed to be located at the site.”[58]
The type of accident presenting the highest risk will be installation dependent. A naval
air station is more likely to have an aircraft accident. A heavy maneuver division of the
Army is more likely to have a weapons malfunction or range fire. This level of risk
analysis is not an insurmountable challenge. The Navy has procedures that allow for the
operation of aircraft, the loading of munitions and movement of other vessels in and
around its nuclear powered equipment. It conducts operations safely and without incident
because it has established the procedures and training to ensure safety. Army personnel
operate large weapons systems in careful, controlled environments. Thorough planning
and analysis of the effects are part of every operation using weapons systems. The
simplest mitigation technique for large weapons systems is geographically isolating the
firing locations. Many weapons in the military’s arsenal can only be fired at certain,
controlled locations. Some weapons training is even done via simulation.

Figure 32: Paladin Weapon System[62]

Many geographically large, remote installations are used weapons ranges. Systems fired
here cannot be close proximity to dense population centers. The location also makes the
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installation an ideal candidate for SMR power. A reactor would need to be located not
only outside the direct impact areas of these ranges but also outside the area where
malfunctioning systems could impact. Impact planning is done routinely by the military.
Impact experts understand the effects of their weapons functioning both properly and
when they malfunction. The effects of ranges are integrated into all development
planning on military installations. A unique consideration would be the seismic effects
on the reactor systems caused by the impact of locally fired large caliber weapons. While
the impact areas would be far from the reactor site, there would be a potential for system
disruption from the repeated impacts of these systems. The effect of these systems
requires further study.
The NRC also mandates an examination of the impact of airports, dams and significant
transportation networks near the SMR site. The m2Power concept houses reactor
facilities below ground, which significantly minimizes the effects of an aircraft impact on
the facility. Much of the risk associated with these features can also be mitigated using
procedural modifications. Site selection on the installation will be the most important
factor in risk mitigation. Developers and military personnel will need to closely interface
in order to minimize the risk. Site developers must have a complete understanding of the
military mission on the installation and work to minimize impacts while maximizing gain
for the

Manning	
  and	
  Management	
  
Running the SMR facility requires a staff of highly trained personnel. The Department of
Defense could opt train its own reactor operators as it did with the Army Nuclear Power
Program (Appendix A). m2Power reactors offer a wide range of opportunities for the
current force of DoD service members serving in a nuclear related field. It would create
the opportunity for the application of their skills in a joint billet. DoD may consider using
naval reactor personnel as operators for the facility by rotating them through shore
assignments.[57] This would provide naval personnel an opportunity to widen their
technological expertise and become trained on the latest development in nuclear reactor
systems. Shore rotations would also provide naval personnel an assignment that serves as
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a respite from deployments. Additionally, other military branches have nuclear nonproliferation experts within their ranks. The Army employs officers in the field called
Functional Area 52, which is nuclear nonproliferation. These officers could benefit from
assignments with a military reactor team. Not only could they improve their
understanding of the nuclear power industry, they would be able to apply their nonproliferation expertise to the facility. Health physics and radiation safety officers within
the branches of service could gain valuable interdisciplinary experience by rotating
through assignments at an m2Power facility.
The Department of Defense could also contract reactor operation personnel from
commercial organizations operating in the United States. By doing this, DoD saves
money on personnel costs and ensures that facility is maintained and operated by a staff
that is already familiar with the industry. Commercial nuclear power generation
companies understand the licensing and training requirements unique to the nuclear
industry. They have established protocols and procedures to ensure regulatory
compliance. While the military has service members trained in the some fields of the
nuclear industry, their expertise is not in land based plant operations. A contract team
brings a level of operational experience and expertise to the program that would take
many years to grown internally within the military.

Figure 33: Nuclear Energy Workers From Duke Energy[63]
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Contract development would need to consider the complexity of nuclear power plant
management when setting contract timelines. The contract would need to offer the
awarded company stability in its position. The management and operation of a complex
reactor facility requires an extensive investment in the hiring and training of personnel.
A company cannot afford to invest such a commitment unless the contact guarantees
operation of the facility for an extended period of time. To ensure contract performance,
DoD could place military representatives imbedded in the operations and management of
the facility. This is achievable by rotating military officers within the nuclear fields
through the facility for short-term assignments. These personnel could not only aid in the
operation of the reactor but also act as military technical advisors to the installation
commander. These officers have the military expertise needed to understand the impact
of a reactor on installation operations. They would be able to provide honest and open
evaluations of the work conducted by the contracted reactor operator and aid in the
procurement of further resources for the facility.
Contract discussions must also involve the delineation of liability. The installation
commander is responsible for all actives on the base. The reactor operator however,
should be held liable for accidents caused by mismanagement or operational errors.
Responsibility for shutdown, decommissioning, cleanup and disposal of the facility
would be that of the Defense Department. Discussions about liability and responsibilities
must be included in the reactor development plan.
Transportation	
  
Military installations are well equipped to handle the transportation requirements of
moving nuclear fuel and equipment. Installations are usually accessible by both highway
and railroad. Military units use rail facilities to load and unload military equipment for
transportation to support operations all over the world. Installations are equipped with
loading yards for trucks to upload and download cargo. They have specialized equipment
designed to move and lift heavy equipment from the trucks. Some installations are
equipped with runways capable of supporting the worlds largest transport planes.
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Military planners are familiar with transporting equipment that is unusual in size and
sensitive in nature.

Figure 34: Fuel Casks Being Shipped By Rail[30]

Accident considerations must be examined when analyzing the transportation of fuel to
the SMR facility. Much of the impact of this kind of accident can be mitigate through
route selection. Fuel transportation will require increased security to it would be ideal to
conduct the operation during a period of low activity on the installation. Any lifting or
delicate movement of nuclear fuel casks should be done as near to the reactor facility as
possible. Nuclear fuel shipping casks are very robust but in the event of an accident, the
installation needs to have a procedure in place ensure the incident site is secure until
clean up is complete. Military personnel are familiar with the movement of sensitive
equipment. They will be able to develop movement protocols for nuclear materials into
their standing operating procedures.
Spent	
  Fuel	
  Management	
  
Currently in the United States, spent nuclear fuel is being stored on site at commercial
facilities. In August of 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the NRC to
resume work on the geological repository Yucca Mountain. [64] There is still much
debate about the repository and funding the project. Until the debate surrounding the
America’s geological repository results in a solution, spent fuel will continue to be stored
on site at reactor facilities.
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January 2012, The Blue Ribbon Commission released the results of its study on
managing nuclear waste in the United States. It recommends the consolidated storage of
spent nuclear fuel rather than the current method which stores fuel on site at reactors all
across the country.[30] It is conceivable that a storage consolation plan could be
developed in future years. Additionally, the possibility of another geologically repository
besides Yucca Mountain is likely.

Figure 35: Dry Cask Storage for Spent Fuel[30]

For a single reactor project, DoD will more than likely store the spent fuel on site. As it
develops multiple reactors, DoD might consider developing its own consolidated spent
fuel storage location. As advanced reactor technology improves, spent DoD m2Power
fuel might prove useful as fuel source for new reactor designs. A consolidated storage
location for all DoD fuel would be ideal for siting an advanced reactor like PRISM,
which could be used to recycle nuclear fuel. The technology has many years to mature
but it is in planning now that DoD prepares for the future.
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Chapter	
  9:	
  	
  Implementation	
  Strategy	
  Building	
  From	
  a	
  Proven	
  
Concept	
  
Taking a conceptual design from graph paper to reality is one of the hardest tasks in
engineering. Even known technology takes years to develop, resource, plan, and
construct. In choosing the m2Power reactor, DoD’s use of a tested reactor technology
rather than starting from the conceptual beginning speeds its implementation. The
m2Power reactor utilizes technology that has extensive testing, evaluation and proof of
concept in the basic design of LWR technology. The application of LWR technology to
smaller reactors is a new aspect of the design, which needs validation. DoD capitalizes
on the research being done B&W, TVA, the NRC and the Department of Energy in that it
will not need to recreate the their efforts. Those organizations will use their time,
resources and expertise to test, validate and improve the mPower design and SMR
commercial power concept.
The Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is a tool that helps DoD evaluate, rank and
prioritize the developmental needs of the m2Power reactor.[65] Table 8 summarizes the
TRLs for the m2Power reactor.[66] The table compares the TRL posture of the Clinch
River Project and a DoD m2Power reactor. DoD benefits from the use of previous
research and development from the Clinch River program. The table shows the TRL
levels for a m2Power reactor used for electrical and cogeneration purposes. The analysis
is color coded to indicate the progress made toward accomplishing each TRL.
DoD benefits significantly from the work being done on the Clinch River Project as it not
only validates the technology but also helps establish the SMR regulatory framework
with the NRC. DoD would need to conduct assessments independent of the Clinch River
project beginning at TRL 7 as it moved the reactor into an operational environment. At
that point, the impacts of siting a reactor on a military installation would need special
consideration by both the NRC and the armed services. A full analysis of the TRL
assessment can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 8: Technology Readiness Assessment for mPower use on DoD Installation

DoD/Technology/Readiness/Levels
TRL

Definition

1

Basic&principles&observed&
and&reported

2

Technology&concept&
and/or&application&
formulated

3

Analytical&and&
experimental&critical&
function&and/or&
characteristic&proof&of&
concept
Component&and/or&
breadboard&validation&in&
a&laboratory&
environment
Component&and/or&
breadboard&validation&in&
a&relevant&environment
System/subsystem&
model&or&prototype&
demonstration&in&a&
relevant&environment
System&prototype&
demonstration&in&an&
operational&
environment.
Actual&system&completed&
and&qualified&through&
test&and&demonstration.
Actual&system&proven&
through&successful&
mission&operations.

4
5
6
7
8
9

Clinch/River/Project DoD//Power

DoD/CHP

Complete

B&W&Work,&
Complete

&Complete

Complete

B&W&Work,& Past&Analysis&
Complete Review/Update

Complete

B&W&Work,& Past&Analysis&
Complete Review/Update

Complete

B&W&Work,&
Complete

Complete

B&W&Work,&
Complete

Operating&Since&July&
2012,&In&Progress
InLProgress
InLProgress
InLProgress
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The	
  Collaborative	
  Team	
  
One of the most challenge aspects of project management is the development and control
of the collaborative team. It is important to keep each team member fully engaged. Tasks
and responsibilities must be divided in such a manner that best capitalizes on the
collective expertise. It is incredibly challenging to provide oversight of large numbers of
contracts and ensure that each contractor provides high quality work. [65] The
Department of Defense runs some of the largest project management operations in the
world. Projects range from simple lawn care operations to troop food preparation in chow
halls to the development, testing and fielding new fighter jets.
In the collaborative team for the development of an SMR, DoD will need to extend
contractual relationships into the nuclear industry. The Department of Defense has
contractual relationships with reactor manufacturers supporting nuclear navy operations
as well as government organizations. Defense personnel work closely with DoE and the
NNSA to manage the nuclear fuel supplies for naval vessels. The protocols and
relationships defined to support the nuclear navy will be helpful in defining a framework
of procedures for land based reactor operations. During the early years of Army Nuclear
Power Program, there was confusion around the overall control of the project. The first
reactor, SM-1 at Ft. Belvoir VA, was developed in a disjointed manner that loosely
aligned the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army Corps of Engineers and the reactor
contractor. The result was overlapping responsibilities as well as gaps in task
completion. The Army learned from this project and streamlined all operations under the
Army Corps of Engineers for further reactor projects. Having a single project
management office for the development of an m2Power reactor will aid in streamlining
the collaborative efforts of the team.
Program	
  Organization	
  
A land based m2Power project would be a Department of Defense level operation. DoD
would need to establish a centralized program office to manage the collaborative team as
no such structure exists within the organization today. The m2Power Nuclear Program
Office would be the office responsible for the overall project management of siting,
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licensing and constructing an m2Power facility. Figure 35 shows a simplified
organizational chart that illustrates just a few of collaborative team members under to
m2Power Nuclear Program Office. As the project grows, this organizational chart will
increase in complexity.

Department)of)Defense)
m2Power)Nuclear)
Program)Oﬃce)

Department)of)
Defense)Organic)
Assets)

External)
Assets)

Department)of)
Energy)

NRC)

EPA)

B&W)
TVA))

NNSA)
Oﬃce)of)
Nuclear)
Energy)

DoE)Labs)

Reactor)
Operator))

Installa@on)
Management)
Branch)Engineering)

(Army)Corps)of)Engineers,)
Air)force)CE,)etc))

Personnel)
Management)
Joint)Chiefs)of)
Staﬀ)

Figure 36: Nuclear Power Program Office Oragnaztional Chart

The expertise in land reactor operations exists outside the Department of Defense.
Coordination with these experts is vital to the success of the project. There will be
extensive coordination with other government agencies. Defense officials will need to
coordinate closely with Department of Energy as it is the government leader in the
development of energy systems and is at the forefront of SMR development. The NNSA
will need to be included as DoD develops a fuel cycle plan for sustaining the reactor.
DoE laboratories play a key role in the research of new energy technology. While there
is no need for the development of new technology in an m2Power reactor, the impacts of
putting a nuclear reactor on a military installation need further study. DoE employs the
experts capable of making independent, unbiased analysis of siting SMRs on military
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installations. DoE laboratories will also be able to aid the Department of Defense in
finding the most environmentally suited installation for siting a m2Power reactor.
The NRC will want to examine licensing changes associated with putting the reactor on a
military installation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will need to be
included in the assessment of environmental impacts of the reactor on the military
installation environment as well as that of the surrounding comminutes. Military
installations already have unique environmental impacts to their surroundings.
Evaluations of environmental impacts from the installations would need to be updated to
include nuclear operations.
Defense officials will play a pivotal role in assessing which installations are suited for
nuclear power. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand the missions of each of their
installations and would be best suited to analyze the impact of nuclear reactor technology
on their base. Personnel management is controlled at the individual branch level. Joint
military personnel analysis would need to be conducted at interdepartmental levels in
order to best understand the talents of the nuclear personnel within each branch. From
this assessment, the m2Power Nuclear Program Office could develop a manning
methodology that utilizes current DoD personnel and provides opportunities to enhance
organic nuclear professional development without sacrificing mission performance within
the branches. Each branch of the military handles construction projects through their
own organizations. The Army uses the Army Corps of engineers. The Air Force utilizes
Air Force civil engineers. Once an installation is determined to be a suitable prototype
installation for the first m2Power facility, the program office will work closely with those
engineers as well as the installation management commanders.
Non-governmental organizations will also work with the m2Power Nuclear Program
Office. Reactor designers from B&W will need to re-validate design criteria taking into
considerations any impact from military installation siting. The reactor operator chosen
to run the facility will need to not only be aware of reactor operations but also understand
its interface with the military installation it services. The NRC analysis will need to come
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from the m2Power reactor team so an expert on licensing SMRs will be needed. This
could possibly be internal to B&W or perhaps come from one of the TVA experts on the
Clinch River Project.

Financing	
  Considerations	
  
Financing the costs of large projects is a complicated process. DoD funds many of its
acquisition projects through direct appropriation of funds over a given number of years.
A project of this size would require large amounts of funding but it is not on a scale
unfamiliar to DoD. Additionally, much of the expense which goes into developing “first
of a kind” technology has already been covered by DoE as it works in collaboration with
B&W and TVA. DoD would need to source funding for military specific site
assessments. Funding is available under current budgets for renewable energy projects.
Funding for any reactor modification to meet military installation needs could be jointly
shared through the Departments of Energy and Defense.
Construction and operation costs could be handled in a similar manner as current
renewable energy projects. Conservation and renewable energy performance contracts
allow developers to be paid from the savings or revenues made through conservation or
energy generation. In a similar way, a developer undertaking the m2Power project could
be paid by the power generated for the military. Because nuclear facilities have extremely
long life spans, a utility company would be guaranteed an excellent source of long term
revenue once initial expenses are repaid. Additionally, the provider would be alleviated
of all fuel procurement, storage and decommissioning costs, as DoD would assume these
responsibilities. This kind of arrangement drastically reduces the overhead cost for the
developer. Finally, if the base fails to use all this power generated, a utility company
could be further incentivized through having the latitude to sell excess power to other
customers.

	
  

89

Chapter	
  10:	
  Conclusion	
  and	
  Summary	
  
In an effort to improve its energy security, DoD has linked energy security to its efforts to
reduce climate change. Many of the measures undertaken by the Department are
performing well. DoD investments on conservation efforts have resulted in a much more
efficient use of facility energy on its installations. New buildings begin construction with
a target goal of being functional as well as being energy efficient. Old buildings receive
many upgrades, which help minimize the waste of heating or cooling resources. The
Department is actively monitoring its real property to try and identify areas where energy
waste can be minimized.
Despite the increases in energy efficiency, DoD is failing to secure its future. By
focusing solely on a limited definition of renewable technology, DoD power production
does not provide it with a sustainable power source. The current renewable energy
sources used by DoD are inefficient, low production methods that are susceptible to
seasonal fluctuations. Renewable technologies do not produce the power outputs needed
to sustain the large, technology driven operations of a modern military. These sources
leave an installation tethered to an external civilian power network.
By looking to the nuclear industry, the Department of Defense finds a renewable,
sustainable solution to its energy security. Nuclear fuel is the most powerful source of
energy on the planet. It emits no harmful greenhouse gases. It has a proven history of
reliability within the United States commercial and defense sectors. It can be recycled
into new fuel for existing facilities. Nuclear energy offers DoD a sustainable energy
source that not only meets its large energy demand, but also preserves America’s natural
and man-made resources for many generations. As in the middle of the 20th century,
DoD must make a technological leap in order to fulfill its security mission for the citizens
it serves.
The B&W mPower reactor is currently the most technologically adaptable reactor for use
on a military installation. It produces the power output needed to sustain all installation
energy needs. It produces abundant electrical power. It can also be used for
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cogeneration to produce power or process heat. Process heat applications include base
heating or water procurement. The mPower timeline to commercialization makes it a
solution DoD can recognize in the near future.
In applying the m2Power reactor to a military installation there are some unique
considerations that differentiate it from the commercial product. The most important
consideration is the impact of the reactor on the mission of the installation. A support
system such as a power facility, water treatment plan or garbage disposal plant cannot
interfere with base operations. The commander of an installation must have the freedom
to execute military training with minimal interference from the facility. The size of an
m2Power facility make it ideally suited for reduced impact on military installation
operations. Placement of the m2Power facility on the installation will be dictated by how
it impacts military operations. Commanders will have a reliable source of power with
minimal intrusion. Additionally, the installation offers added security for the power
facility by utilizing established military security protocols. Many installations are in
remote locations that present a viable option for national spent fuel consolidation
program. The military has many nuclear trained personnel who can aid in the operation
and management of an m2Power facility.
The Babcock and Wilcox mPower small modular nuclear reactor offers the Department
of Defense the technical paradigm shift needed to secure its installation energy future.
By looking at the current energy strategy of the Department of Defense, it is clear that
DoD does not have a sustainable energy solution. While its reduction initiatives are
effectively optimizing energy demand, its production measures are woefully lacking in
output. A shift to sustainable, nuclear power secures DoD’s energy future. With a
careful understanding of military operations, the placement of an m2Power facility on an
installation will provide it sustainable, clean energy for many years. To confront the
advanced threats facing the Nation today, the Department of Defense needs a robust,
technical response. Nuclear energy provided a revolutionary change in the Cold War of
the 20th century and is postured to provide that same change in the conflicts of the 21st
century.
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Appendix	
  A:	
  Army	
  Nuclear	
  Power	
  Program	
  
The Army first investigated using nuclear power to provide electricity and heat to
military installations in the 1950s. Observing success within the Navy and its campaign
to power submarines with nuclear power, Army leadership wondered if this new
technology could be useful to power some of their remote out stations or even be made
into a portable power source. An initial studied conducted by Dr. Lawrence Hafstad of
the AEC working at ORNL concluded that it was feasible for a small scale nuclear
reactor to be used to power a military installation.
The Army Nuclear Power Program began in 1953 with a joint partnership between the
Army Corps of Engineers and Atomic Energy Commission. Heading the program was
Col. James B. Lampert. Much of the initial work in establishing the program revolved
around the allocation of responsibility for cost of construction. The AEC and DOD
created a detailed contract that outlined which portions of a proposed plant would be
funding by each department. Eventually the decision was made that the AEC would
construct the nuclear power portion of the plant and the Army Corps of Engineers would
construct the traditional power generation station. There were specific contractual
provisions about the fuel transfers and costs associated with fabrication and reprocessing.
On July 21, 1954 the final proposed joint funding contract was approved and by
December the program had contracted ALCO (American Locomotive Company) to
construct the plant.
The Army Nuclear Power division quickly realized that it would need a prototype reactor
site from which they could test the technology and train personnel before it started
putting reactors in remote locations. The first reactor built was SM-1 at Ft. Belvoir VA.
The reactor was a 10MWth pressurized water reactor. SM-1 had 38 fuel elements and 7
control rods. On April 8, 1957 it achieved criticality. It began its 700-hour load testing
on June 2, 1957 and successfully operated at varying loads form 10% to 100% being shut
down for only 7 hours and 28 minutes to install testing instrumentation. The facility
became fully operational in 1958 and ran for 16 years without accident. While
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constructing SM-1, the Army Nuclear Power division realized that significant training
was required for individuals to work on these sites. SM-1 became not only the prototype
reactor but also the training facility. Individuals selected to work in power production
underwent training from the University of Virginia, Pennsylvania State and University of
California Berkley. They received instruction from equipment manufactures as well.
Men were chosen from the Army Signal Corps and the Army Corps of Engineers. They
were expected to have a master’s degree in nuclear engineering or some closely related
field.
While the project in VA was underway, the Col Lampert began planning and developing
the first remote power station at Ft. Greely, AK. This station had extreme environmental
temperature variations as well as the challenge of being very remote. The purpose of this
station would be to test the feasibility of using a reactor in arctic conditions. After a long
and challenging funding validation process SM-1A was approved for development in
Alaska. Learning from the challenges of the SM-1 contact, this project was entirely
managed by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers contacted Kiewit
Construction to build the reactor facility. SM-1A was different from its predecessor in
hat it was a true combined heat and power facility. Half of the energy it created was used
to generate steam for power generation and the other half was used for installation
heating. Additionally, the cooling water for this location came from deep wells rather
than a river such as SM-1’s use of the Potomac. Plagued by delays and faulty
instrumentation, SM-1A went critical on March 13, 1962. Over the next two years of
testing, the plant faced many minor challenges resulting in a difficult testing process. On
August 9, 1964, SM-1A became fully operational and went on to set the record for
continuous operations by a military reactor facility of 2750 hours. SM-1A proved that
reactor technology could be used in remote and austere locations to provided combined
heat and power to an installation.
The Army Nuclear Reactor Program reached its peak in early 1960s. At the height of the
program, there were a number of reactors operating independently in remote locations.
PM-2A was located at Camp Century in the inland of Greenland. This plant was unique
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in that it was designed to be portable. Many portions of it were shipped via air straight
into Camp Century while the nuclear power portion was moved via ship. After
installation in 1962, the plant ran for a few short months. Due to a reduction in the
mission at Camp Century, it was no longer needed and subsequently disassembled and
shipped back to the United States. It demonstrated not only functionality in an austere
environment but showed that the reactor system was truly portable. Other portable
reactors included PM-1, which ran a radar site in Sundance Wyoming. PM-1 provided
heat and power to the radar facility operated by NORAD. PM-3A operated at a Naval
land station in McMurdo Sound Antarctica. Despite the logistical and environmental
challenges associated with operation in Antarctica, this reactor facility successfully
provided power to 150 personnel for 11 years. It was decommissioned in 1972.
Other innovative designs came from the program. The Army Transportation Corps
explored the idea of the Military Compact Reactor (MCR) that could power a vehicle or a
train. The ML-1 project was a portable gas cooled reactor that could be loaded on a truck
or barge or train and sent forward with deployed troops. ML-1 was actually built and
operated in Idaho and was unique to the military because it was the first gas-cooled
reactor. MH-1A was a floating nuclear reactor mounted on a barge named Sturgis. The
Sturgis was specially built and designed to carry the reactor. MH-1A went critical on
January 24, 1967 while docked at Ft Belvoir. It was operated by an engineer detachment
and provided power to the base. The state department eventually entered into a contract
with the State of Panama to use the Sturgis to power the Panama Canal Zone. The boat
was towed to Panama in 1968 and moored with the hydroelectric station. Once hooked
into the station, the boat provided power to the Canal Zone for 8 years. The Sturgis was
returned to the United States in 1977 following negations concerning about ownership of
the Canal Zone. It was decommissioned and put into anchorage in 1978.
The first signs of program decline following an accident at reactor facility SL-1 located in
Idaho. This was the first boiling water reactor used by the military. After testing, SL-1
operated successfully for two years and was used to conduct training for military crews
on a boiling water plant. On December 23, 1960, the facility was shutdown for routine
maintenance. During maintenance, it is theorized that one of the reactor operators moved
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a central control rod too quickly causing prompt criticality, instantaneous superheating of
the core water and vaporization to steam. The massive pressure caused an explosion and
killed three operators. No radioactive material leaked from the facility. Many lessons
were learned about operating procedures and BWR design following the accident.
Nevertheless, the accident was a significant blemish on the record of the nuclear power
program.
Despite running many successful reactors and demonstrating their functionality in remote
in austere locations, funding constraints at the end of the 1960s caused a reexamination of
the Army Nuclear Power Program. In the late 60s, the Vietnam War began to
significantly affect DoD’s budget. Military leaders looked for places to make cuts in
spending. Analysis of the Army Nuclear Power Program showed that it was not cost
effective to build such expensive projects in support of remote locations, many of which
only had operating missions of a few years. The Army sought to define the requirements
for the program but in light of the competing costs of the Vietnam war it was determined
that remote stations could still be powered more cheaply by diesel fuel. SM-1 never
produced electricity at a rate that was cheaper than the base could have purchased it from
the local utility. Thus the Army cut funding to the research and development portion of
the Army Nuclear Program. By 1975 all reactors had been deactivated with the
exception of the Sturgis and the program had transitioned to the Engineer Power Group
focused on storing and maintaining non-tactical generators on installations. The group
restructured again in 1977 and assumed responsibility of installation maintenance and
remote power procurement. By the 1980s, the Engineer Power Group had turned its
focus entirely to the maintenance of installation facilities such as the maintenance and
repair of real property, construction, fire prevention systems and environmental
controls.[67]
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Appendix	
  B:	
  SMR	
  Design	
  Assessments	
  
mPower	
  
B.1 Safety: The mPower reactor incorporates the latest passive and active safety features
into its small, LWR design. Of primary consideration is potential damaged caused by a
loss of coolant scenario. The mPower reactor reduces the risk of this accident by keeping
all coolant within a single vessel. The reactor facility contains on-site storage of
supplemental water than can provide cooling for a minimum of 7 days. Many of the
reactor controls have passive redundancies in the event of a power loss. The facility itself
is seismically hardened as well as resistant to flooding. The LWR technology is proven
and well tested. Designers’ depth of knowledge and practical experience with these types
of reactors allows for a much more complete understanding of potential accident
scenarios than then more experimental reactor designs.
B.2 Power Output: The mPower reactor has a power output of 155 MWe or 530 MWth.
This size of reactor adequately meets the needs of a DoD installation with one module.
There is enough energy generated to be both a source of electricity as well as being used
for process heat applications like district heating.
B.3 Physical Size: A two-module facility with a spent fuel storage pond occupies a 40acre site. The anticipated exclusion zone is less than a mile.
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The mPower reactor runs for 4 years at 95% capacity before
requiring refuel. A two-module system could operate on offset refueling intervals so as
to always provide constant power to an installation. Two modules would generate an
excess amount of power for a typical installation. A one-module facility could be
operated at less than 95% to increase refueling intervals. An installation could use
civilian power during times of refueling. Potentially this could be at no cost if DoD
could earn credit by supplying the civilian provider with excess power during times of
normal operations. Modifications to the fuel configuration could also increase the time
between refuel operations.
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B.5 Licensing: The mPower reactor closely resembles the LWR models used by the NRC
under its current regulatory framework. TVA plants to use the mPower reactor at its new
SMR facility under development at Clinch River. TVA’s Clinch River project is
presenting the NRC with its first SMR licensing test. In evaluating the Clinch River
project, the NRC must not only license a new reactor design but also it must also look at
the project from a new perspective. TVA is planning to install mPower modules, which
currently are still in need of design certification from the NRC. The siting of the mPower
units and how they will be implemented over time require not only forethought on the
part of TVA, but also require flexibility in regulation from the NRC to make the project
economical. It is unreasonable for TVA to have to readdress all regulatory requirements
for every additional mPower module they add to the site. TVA must forecast facility
impacts on the environment and conduct accident analysis assuming the facility is
operating at its largest planned capacity. The NRC should be flexible and allow TVA to
implement its mPower installation timeline freely as long as it stays within its forecast
capacity.
B.6 Public Acceptance: The LWR design is the reactor design most easily accepted by
the public. It is not a large divergence from currently used reactor technology and
mPower can boast of many new safety features that differentiate it from the more
troubled reactors like Fukushima. Additionally, mPower has an edge over other SMR
technologies as TVA constructs a first of its kind facility using mPower near future at
Clinch River. An operating reactor facility will provide the public comfort by knowing
that other commercial manufactures are using it and the military installation is not being
used to test new technology.
B.7 Fuel Cost: The mPower reactor uses standard LWR fuel. No special fabrication
facilities are needed to provide fuel for the reactor. Current fuel cycle processes would
be capable of sustaining this reactor.
B.8 Maturity of Technology: LWR technology is the most widely used reactor
technology. mPower incorporates many new safety features and design changes however
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the basic technology remains unchanged. Due to the mature nature of the technology,
LWR designs are the quickest to be implemented for military use. They require very
little further testing of reactor components or systems. mPower has a test reactor, which it
operates, and might soon have the first commercial designs used for power production.
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The mPower reactor produces thermal energy at
temperatures high enough to provide district heating as well as nuclear desalination. It
could be used for limited chemical production applications as well. The single reactor
produces enough energy to be used as a cogeneration facility to combine electrical
production as well as some process heat applications.[42]

NuScale	
  
B.1 Safety: The NuScale reactor takes advantage of natural circulation to sustain coolant
flow within its system. Natural circulation is advantageous as it operates both actively
and passively. It has a number of redundant decay heat removal systems (DHRS and
ECCS) as well as being situated within a pond of cooling water. The reactor facility is
located below ground and is hardened against natural disasters. The NuScale design
incorporates spent fuel storage cooling into its plant safety analysis. The spent fuel pool
has a cooling capacity with the water volume necessary to accommodate high or low
density fuel racks. It has an additional water supply that can be activated by reactor
personnel in safe locations. The NuScale design incorporates an active refuel operation.
Refueling operations are conducted at the same time the facility produces power. While
this is economical advantageous, it does induce risk in the form of operational and
process errors. These errors are compounded in severity as the other reactor modules
could be operating at the time of an accident. Extensive risk analysis is needed to identify
the risks during refuel operations as well as the adoption of strict refuel procedures and
protocols. Many of the NuScale safety features are in direct response to the Fukushima
accident. These features allow designs to directly answer Fukushima safety questions
from critics as well as comply with new NRC guidance.

104

B.2 Power Output: The NuScale reactor outputs 45 MWe or 160 MWth. The reactor
output is small but it intended to be operated in a multi-module facility. A DoD
installation would need 2-3 reactors to meet its basic electrical needs. If it wanted to
conduct process heat applications, it would need additional modules. The small output of
the modules allows DoD to tailor each facility to the installation.
B.3 Physical Size: A 12-module facility with a spent fuel storage pond occupies a 44acre site. The anticipated exclusion zone is much smaller than current commercial
reactors.
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The NuScale module requires refueling every 2 years. For a 12
module facility, this means refueling a module every 2 months. Facility operators would
undergo refuel operations on a constant schedule. For a facility with fewer modules, the
refueling intervals would be easier to offset. For DoD, a 3 to 4 module facility would
require one module refueled every 6 months. During times of refuel, consideration must
be given to the reduced power capacity of the facility. It may be necessary to increase the
number of modules to account for refuel outages.
B.5 Licensing: NuScale is part of a DoE partnership to enhance the use of SMR
technology. NuScale began its pre-application in 2008 and is expected to have design
certification from the NRC in 2015. [68]While it is slightly behind mPower on the
licensing timeline, it benefits from the development of regulatory framework that is
developing around mPower. The reactor technology is not drastically different than a
LWR so licensing questions will revolve mostly around the SMR framework and
individual technologies.
B.6 Public Acceptance: The LWR design is the reactor design most easily accepted by
the public. It is not a large divergence from currently used reactor technology and
mPower can boast of many new safety features that differentiate it from the more
troubled reactors like Fukushima. NuScale has safety features that can are designed to be
in direct response to the Fukushima accident. These features will aid developers by
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increasing public confidence in the design as they point out its key safety differences
from the troubled reactor. Additionally, similar SMR technology is being implemented
commercially at Clinch River. An operating commercial reactor with a similar design
will provide the public comfort by knowing that the military installation is not being used
to test new, unproven technology.
B.7 Fuel Cost: The NuScale reactor uses standard LWR fuel. No special fabrication
facilities are needed to provide fuel for the reactor. Current fuel cycle processes would
be capable of sustaining this reactor.
B.8 Maturity of Technology: LWR technology is the most widely used reactor
technology. NuScale incorporates many new safety features and design changes however
the basic technology remains unchanged. Due to the mature nature of the technology,
LWR designs are the quickest to be implemented for military use. They require very
little further testing of reactor components or systems. NuSclae has a prototype reactor
used to test systems and controls of the individual module. They have yet to develop a
full NuScale power generation facility.
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The NuScale rector could be used for both district
heating and nuclear desalination. It is unlikely that it could be used for cogeneration
while operating as a single module. Working in an array of modules, NuScale technology
could be used to power a cogeneration facility.[36]

PRISM	
  
B.1 Safety: The use of sodium as a coolant provides both safety advantages and
disadvantages. Sodium coolant is operated under low pressure, which eliminates the loss
of pressure accident within the core. Sodium’s reactivity with water is risk unique to
SFR. Reactor designers mitigate this risk by using intermediate cooling loops to separate
core coolant from steam production. Leaks within sodium reactors can pose potential
dangers as the coolant reacts with air or water. Sodium cooled reactors have been
operated and many have experienced small leaks which were easily contained. There is a
history of leak detection and isolation controls for the operation of SFR. The PRISM
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incorporates decay heat removal systems to passively remove heat from the core during
normal or emergency shutdown. The Auxiliary Cooling System (ACS) removes heat
from the vessel by using forced or natural circulation to pass air along the exterior of the
reactor vessel. The Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System (RVACS) adds additional
cooling air to the ACS using passive systems only. Additionally, the RVACS provides
protection to the reactor vessel in event of failure to a heat removal system as decay heat
is transferred through the vessel to the surrounding containment. The PRISM reactors are
designed to be operated in a variety of configurations. The lack of uniformity presents an
operational risk, as there is an increased potential for human induced errors, especially
while simultaneously operating a number of PRISM reactors in different configurations.
B.2 Power Output: The PRISM outputs 311 MWe or 840 MWth. This is more than
enough to meet the needs of a DoD installation. If operated as part of a waste
management solution, it could provide power for the waste reprocessing as well as
installation power. Excess power could be sold to a local utility.
B.3 Physical Size: PRISM reactors are part of the ARC solution to nuclear waste. The
anticipated ARC facility will be very large and is unlikely to be situated on a military
compound.
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The PRISM refuel cycle is 12- 24 months depending on fuel
configuration for the mission of the PRISM. The intent of the ARC facility is nuclear
fuel reduction through re-use within a PRISM module. Thus, increased refueling
intervals aid ARC operators by providing increased opportunities to burn used nuclear
fuel.
B.5 Licensing: The PRISM reactor diverges greatly from the LWR framework used by
the NRC. As an advanced reactor, there are many questions concerning the development
of a licensing framework.
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B.6 Public Acceptance: The benefits of the sodium cooled, nuclear waste fueled PRISM
present an attractive solution to the Nation’s nuclear waste challenges. Using a reactor
with the capacity to run on spent fuel would be certain to have strong public appeal. The
public might be concerned about the use of advanced reactor technology since it the
project would be a first of its kind development. The public would be more likely to
accept the project if it was located far from population centers on a remote military
installation. This kind of implementation is likely to have strong approval as it not only
presents a viable solution to nuclear waste disposal but it also keeps the reactor out of
major population centers. The public is likely to approve of its placement on a military
installation as these facilities already have established security protocols.
B.7 Fuel Cost: The PRISM reactor requires specific fuel in order to operate. It is
indented to be coupled to a fuel-recycling center, which would accept and process nuclear
waste. The recycling center would then repackage the waste into useable fuel for the
PRISM reactor. Fuel manufacturing for the PRISM would be expensive however if
coupled to a solution to the disposal of nuclear waste, might be an acceptable cost.
Funding for a project of this scale requires cooperation of many departments within the
government and is unlikely to be conducted solely by the Department of Defense.
B.8 Maturity of Technology: Sodium cooled reactors have an extensive history of testing
and operation. They are not currently used in the United States. The PRISM has a
number to technological advances that require further testing and evaluation. A large
component of this design is evaluating the fuel-recycling center. This reactor is
considered advanced and is still in the research and development stages of
implementation.
B.6 Process Heat Applications: While the PRISM reactor attains temperatures that could
be used for process heat applications, its primary purpose is nuclear fuel recycling. It
could be used however for nuclear desalination or district heating. A fuel recycling
facility located in a remote location could find some use in the application of excess
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energy. Process heat applications of thermal energy could be used for life support
systems of the facility staff. [38]
4S	
  
B.1 Safety: The 4S reactor has the same advantages and disadvantages as the PRISM
reactor due to using sodium as a coolant. The 4S reactor incorporates a number of
passive decay heat removal systems such as the IRACS and RVACS. The 4S reactor is
intended to be a stand-alone, minimum maintenance reactor. By reducing the number of
reactivity changes, reducing maintenance outages and eliminating refuel operations, the
reactor has a reduced risk of procedural induced accidents (human error). This
operational approach does increase the risk from material failure induced accidents, as
there is a reduced level of scheduled maintenance on the facility. Proper risk analysis
needs to be done to define material failure times. The maintenance checks must then be
conducted within appropriate time standards to prevent failures.
B.2 Power Output: The 4S reactor produces 10 MWe. This output will not sustain a
large DoD installation. There are small, remote outstations however that could be
sustained on 10 MWe.
B.3 Physical Size: The 4S reactor is very small and intended for remote locations. It is
well suited to fit in confined spaces, as it requires no storage for spent fuel. Increasing
the number of 4S modules would increase the land requirements however these modules
are not intended to be operated collectively.
B.4 Refueling Cycle: The 4S reactor has no refuel option. It runs for 30 years
continuously and is then replaced. This significantly reduces fuel and operating costs.
B.5 Licensing: The 4S reactor diverges greatly from the LWR framework used by the
NRC. As an advanced reactor, there are many questions concerning the development of a
licensing framework.
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B.6 Public Acceptance: The 4S reactor is much smaller and longer lived than other SMR
designs. These characteristics make it uniquely suited for certain situations. The public
is likely to approve of a remote power, long-term power source like the 4S reactor if it is
clearly tied to a solution for a challenging problem. Most ideally it would be suited for
providing power to locations within third world countries to sustain medical and foreign
aid operations. These locations face challenging security situations so its antiproliferation design features aid the reactor. Additionally the reactor requires very little
active control so it does not need the typical large, well trained, expensive staff found in a
commercial facility. The public is likely to accept this reactor abroad and could be used
by the military on small installations outside the United States. It could also be used at
small remote sites within the US. Within the country, the public might be concerned
about the minimal staffing requirements as well as the first of its kind technology.
B.7 Fuel Cost: The 4s reactor uses a uniquely designed fuel pin with a glass plenum
running along het center axis of the pin. It is a unique design and would require
specialized fabrication. While this would be more costly than standard LWR fuel, it is
also a one-time expense. The reactor runs for 30 years without the need for refueling.
The longevity of the fuel cycle offsets the expense of the fuel.
B.8 Maturity of Technology: Sodium cooled reactors have an extensive history of testing
and operation. They are not currently used in the United States. The 4S reactor has a
number to technological advances that require further testing and evaluation. Further
research is needed for both material and fuel pin design. This reactor is considered
advanced and is still in the research and development stages of implementation.
B.6 Process Heat Applications: The 4S reactor does not produced enough energy to
provide both process heat and electricity. It is possible it could be used for process heat
applications in stand-alone facilities on a small scale.[39]
Reactor	
  Assessment	
  
The reactors are ranked on a scale of 1 through 4. A score of 1 is given the reactor with
the best characteristics to meet the design consideration. All characteristics are equally
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weighted. Each subsequent reactor is ranked numerically. The reactor with the lowest
total score is the one that meets the current design needs of the Department of Defense
for providing installation energy security. This assessment shows that the mPower
reactor is most suited for powering a DoD installation.

Reactor

mPower NuScale PRISM

4S

Safety

3

2

4

1

Power/Output

1

2

3

4

Physical/Size

2

3

4

1

Refueling/Cycle

2

3

4

1

Licensing

1

2

4

3

Public/
Acceptance

1

2

4

3

Fuel/Costs

1

2

4

3

Maturity/of/
Technology

1

2

4

3

Process/Heat/
Applications

1

3

2

4

Score

13

21

33

23
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Appendix	
  C:	
  Technology	
  Readiness	
  Assessment	
  for	
  DoD	
  Power	
  Reactor	
  and	
  
Combined	
  Heat	
  and	
  Power	
  Facility	
  
This table was prepared using the 2011 Department of Defense Technology Readiness
Level Assessment Guidebook.[66]
DoD2Technology2Readiness2Levels
TRL

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Definition

Description

Lowest&level&of&technology&readiness.&
Scientific&research&begins&to&be&
Basic&principles&observed& translated&into&applied&research&and&
and&reported
development&(R&D).&Examples&might&
include&paper&studies&of&a&technology’s&
basic&properties.
Invention&begins.&Once&basic&principles&
are&observed,&practical&applications&can&
Technology&concept&
be&invented.&Applications&are&
and/or&application&
speculative,&and&there&may&be&no&proof&
formulated
or&detailed&analysis&to&support&the&
assumptions.&Examples&are&limited&to&
analytic&studies.
Active&R&D&is&initiated.&This&includes&
analytical&studies&and&laboratory&studies&
Analytical&and&
to&physically&validate&the&analytical&
experimental&critical&
predictions&of&separate&elements&of&the&
function&and/or&
technology.&Examples&include&
characteristic&proof&of&
components&that&are&not&yet&integrated&
concept
or&representative

Component&and/or&
breadboard&validation&in&
a&laboratory&
environment

Basic&technological&components&are&
integrated&to&establish&that&they&will&
work&together.&This&is&relatively&“low&
fidelity”&compared&with&the&eventual&
system.&Examples&include&integration&of&
“ad&hoc”&hardware&in&the&laboratory.

Clinch2River2Project

DoD22Power

No&changes&to&basic&science&from& No&action&needed
LWR&concepts

2

Complete2

Complete2

2

Development&of&improved&safety& No&action&needed&
features,&both&passive&and&active.&
Small,&self&contained&reactor&
conceptualized

2

Complete2

2

Complete2

Analysis&and&modeling&of&passive& No&action&needed
safety&features&and&controls&
unique&to&mPower&reactor.&
Simulations&of&balance&of&plant

2

Complete2

2

2

Complete2

2

InJProgress2

2

Complete2

2

Past2Analysis2Review/
Update2

No&action&need&on&new&reactor&
design.&&Analysis&of&cogeneration&
options/balance&of&plant&utilizing&
lessons&learned&from&Army&
Nuclear&Power&Program

2

Past2Analysis2Review/
Update2

No&action&needed&for&reactor&
technology.&Cogeneration&
technology&components&tested&
(controls,&valves,&load&shedding,&
distribution)

Complete2

No&action&needed

2

2

No&action&needed&for&reactor&
technology.&Analysis&of&
cogeneration&
demands/applications

Complete2

Individual&safety&system&
No&action&needed
development,&testing&and&
modeling.&Laboratory&models&of&
controls&and&safety&features

Fidelity&of&breadboard&technology&
Newly&development&components&
increases&significantly.&The&basic&
tested&in&controlled&reactor&
technological&components&are&integrated& environment&or&test&facility.&&
Component&and/or&
with&reasonably&realistic&supporting&
breadboard&validation&in&
elements&so&they&can&be&tested&in&a&
a&relevant&environment
simulated&environment.&Examples&
include&“highSfidelity”&laboratory&
Complete2
integration&of&components
2
Representative&model&or&prototype&
Reactor&prototype&built&and&
system,&which&is&well&beyond&that&of&TRL& operated&in&controlled&
5,&is&tested&in&a&relevant&environment.&
environment.&B&W&Integrated&
System/subsystem&
Represents&a&major&step&up&in&a&
System&Test&Facility&(fully&
model&or&prototype&
technology’s&laboratory&environment&or& operational&July&2012)
demonstration&in&a&
in&a&simulated&operational&environment&
relevant&environment
demonstrated&readiness.&Examples&
include&testing&a&prototype&in&a&highS
InJProgress2
fidelity
2
Prototype&near&or&at&planned&operational& Reactor&prototype&built&and&
system.&Represents&a&major&step&up&from& operated&in&facility&similar&to&
System&prototype&
TRL&6&by&requiring&demonstration&of&an& commercial&application.&&No&
demonstration&in&an&
actual&system&prototype&in&an&
simulated&conditions.&&Reactor&
operational&
operational&environment&(e.g.,&in&an&airS runs&at&varying&loads&
environment.
craft,&in&a&vehicle,&or&in&space).
continuously&for&determined&test&
period
Technology&has&been&proven&to&work&in& NRC&validation&and&design&
InJProgress2
its&final&form&and&under&expected&
certification&complete
conditions.&In&almost&all&cases,&this&TRL&
Actual&system&completed& represents&the&end&of&true&system&
and&qualified&through&
development.&Examples&include&
test&and&demonstration. developmental&test&and&evaluation&
(DT&E)&of&the&system&in&its&intended&
weapon&system&to&deterSmine&if&it&meets&
InJProgress2
design&specifications.
2
Actual&application&of&the&technology&in& Successful&build&and&operation&of&
its&final&form&and&under&mission&
Clinch&River&Project
conditions,&such&as&those&encountered&in&
Actual&system&proven&
operational&test&and&evaluation&(OT&E).&
through&successful&
Examples&include&using&the&system&under&
mission&operations.
operational&mission&conditions.

DoD2CHP
No&action&needed

Cogeneration&technology&applied&
to&existing&test&reactor&facility.&&
Reactor/process&heat&interface&
validated

Complete2

No&action&needed

Existing&prototype&facility&
coupled&to&process&heat&
application.&Verification&of&
reactor/process&heat&interface.&
Validation&of&all&reactor&
control/safety&features.&Process&
heat&output&confirmed

No&action&needed& Reactor&prototype&facility&
for&technology,&
coupled&to&process&heat&
Analysis&of&
application.&Verification&of&all&
installation&siting& outputs&(power&and&process&
choices&and&
heat)&at&varying&loads.
military&impacts&on&
NRC&licensing
DoD,&Army&Corps& NRC&licensing&of&cogeneration&
of&Engineers&and& design&and&process&heat&
NRC&analysis&and& application&license
validation&of&
impacts&on&license&
for&military&
application.&

mPower&facility&
Successful&build&and&operation&of&
installed&on&pilot& military&installation&CHP&facility.&
installation.&
Incorporation&of&process&heat&
Validation&of&
produced&for&installation&use
systems,&protocols,&
management&and&
operation
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